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Therapeutic Justicet
David B. Wexler*
I. INTRODUCTION
The criminal justice system and related mechanisms of social
and legal control are today experiencing a period of marked doc-
trinal and philosophical tension. Actually, the tension is not
new, and the current conflict simply marks the latest phase-
with a somewhat modern twist-of the tug-of-war between the
"classical criminology" (a blending of Kantian retributive justice
and the utilitarianism of Cesare di Beccaria and Jeremy Ben-
tham) and the "deterministic criminology" of Enrico Ferr
The classical scheme was postulated on a psychology of free
will, from which flowed a series of consequences: that persons
who willingly flout legal commands are morally blameworthy
and are properly candidates for the infliction of society's retri-
butive wrath, which should be meted out by punishments pro-
portionate to the crimes committed, but sufficient also to serve a
deterrent function.1
While the classical model may seem terribly wanting accord-
ing to modern philosophical and behavioral perspectives, it was
actually far superior to its predecessor, which was primarily a
"Hobbesian, selfish, individualistic, cruel, law-and-order-oriented
institution,"2 reflecting a naked exercise of the police power
through repression. Thus, according to a recent comprehensive
study of the changing conceptions of criminal law, it was Beccaria
who proposed certain notions now regarded as fundamental
to our criminal jurisprudence: that only overt acts be punish-
able, that crimes and sentences not be applied ex post facto, that
sentences not be excessive, and that the state bear the burden of
proving criminal guilt.3
- This Article was prepared as a consultant's paper to the Na-
tional Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, and will also appear
in an Appendix to the Commission's report.
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona.
i. N. KITrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVANCE AND EN-
FORCED THERAPY 20-21 (1971).
2. Id. at 8.
3. Id. at 20-21.
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Despite its advances, however, the classical approach was
soon the subject of severe criticism. The principal objection, of
course, was that classical criminology contained simply a series
of mechanistically-imposed penalties that ignored important dis-
tinctions among individual offenders. Developments in biology,
sociology, and psychology began to chip away at the underpin-
nings of the free will doctrine-and a fortiori at the correlative
concepts of individual responsibility and moral blameworthi-
ness-and began to challenge head-on the classical justification of
achieving deterrence in part through retributive punishment. If
environmental or biological factors played important-even de-
terminative-roles in human behavior, then it made little sense
indeed to think that retribution itself could offset or correct those
causal influences. Instead, advocates of a deterministic criminol-
ogy, like Enrico Ferri, a law professor in late nineteenth cen-
tury Italy, called for the abolition of criminal responsibility and
moral guilt as essential ingredients of the criminal law, and pro-
posed that "when an individual has been found to have committed
an act harmful to society, the law should not be concerned with
questions of guilt and its degrees nor with measuring a fit pun-
ishment, but should humanely apply whatever measures are nec-
essary to protect society from further transgressions by the same
individual. ' '4
Ferri's influence in modem criminal law can be felt as
strongly as can Beccaria's. His notion that punishment should
be tailored to fit the criminal rather than the crime is reflected
in large part in modern indeterminate sentence statutes; his de-
emphasis of criminal responsibility is reflected in the trend of
expanding the insanity defense beyond the limited M'Naghten
rule, together with schemes for committing for indefinite treat-
ment those persons acquitted on grounds of insanity; finally,
Ferri's concern for counterbalancing adverse environmental in-
fluences is reflected in the importance modem penology attaches,
at least in theory, to considerations of rehabilitation and voca-
tional training of offenders.
But Ferri's influence cannot be confined simply to reforms
made within the criminal system itself. Indeed, an application of
Ferri's model to many deviant actors suggests the sheer futility,
for them, of the entire penal framework. Professor Nicholas Kit-
trie provides an apt example:
IT]he severity of the crime provides no meaningful measure for
the time or methods required to deal with a particular of-
4. Id. at 29.
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fender. The conduct of an alcoholic charged with disturbing the
peace is not extremely offensive and, consequently, the penal-
ties prescribed for him are not severe. Yet, the reformation
of a chronic alcoholic may require more time and facilities
than the rehabilitation of the one-time passion murderer whose
conduct (arousing a greater urge for social condemnation)
traditionally results in more severe criminal sanctions. As
long as the emphasis was upon the retributive punishment
of the offender and the deterrence of others, a punishment fit-
ting the crime was logically sound. Once the emphasis shifted
to the rehabilitation of the offender and his return to society,
the traditional system of penalties appeared totally inappropri-
ate.5
In other words, the very application of the criminal justice
system to certain types of deviants-to chronic alcoholoics, to
narcotic addicts, to sexual deviates, to the mentally ill-seems
in many instances senseless and unproductive. In many such
cases, no combination of traditional criminal penalties could serve
as an effective response. Accordingly, there has been mounting
pressure to divest the criminal law of jurisdiction over certain
actors and activities that can assumedly be better handled under
a different legal framework. The new framework is designated as
"civil" commitment rather than "criminal" commitment, and its
announced aim is therapeutic. Deviants who are committed
civilly are, under this model, turned over to a body of behavioral
experts for treatment.
This development, which Kittrie terms "the divestment of
criminal justice and the coming of the therapeutic state,"8 re-
ceived its modern-day momentum a decade ago from the United
States Supreme Court in Robinson v. California.7 In Robinson,
the Court held it violative of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the Constitution to punish a person criminally for the
illness of addiction, but in dictum the Court suggested it would
be constitutionally proper to confine addicts involuntarily for the
express purpose of treatment.
But the constitutional go-ahead provided by Robinson and the
consequent increased reliance on the therapeutic model may have
been but a beginning of the modern impact of Enrico Ferri.
Recent advances-or claims of advances-in the behavioral and
biological sciences have been so rapid and so far-reaching that
there will be enormous pressure-some of it already evident-to
5. Id. at 37.
6. Id. at 1.
7. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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continually transfer control to the therapeutic experts. For in-
stance, B.F. Skinner, the Harvard behavioral psychologist who
developed the theory and practice of operant conditioning, has re-
cently asserted in his best-selling book that free will-or "au-
tonomous man"-is an illusion and is simply a shorthand way
of attributing to inner forces those patterns of behavior for which
we cannot yet pinpoint a scientific causal nexus.8 But Skinner,
and a host of his followers in the field of applied behavior anal-
ysis,9 together with other specialists in behavior modification, 0
believe that there already is a technology of behavior capable of
immediate utilization. Moreover, the past few years have wit-
nessed a resurgence of biological explanations of behavioral de-
viance. Thus, neurological theories are being advanced to the ef-
fect that much violent behavior is attributable to pathology of the
limbic (emotional) region of the brain, and is subject to im-
provement or correction by various devices, including psycho-
surgery-the surgical destruction of the diseased portion of the
brain."
Given the current dissatisfaction with the criminal justice
system and the concomitant present and anticipated pressure to
extend the therapeutic premise, it seems appropriate at this time
to take stock of the promises and problems of a therapeutically-
oriented legal system, to sketch the various competing consid-
erations, and to offer a backdrop against which to plan for the
legal future. As should already be evident, the therapeutic ideal
is by no means an unmixed blessing, and the Supreme Court is
well aware of that fact. Although, as we have seen, the Court in
1962 opened the therapeutic door in Robinson, it recognized as
early as five years later that certain legal constraints ought to be
clamped on the curative model.12 And only last term, the Court,
noting the large number of persons processed through various
civil commitment schemes, expressed surprise over the fact that
the state's coercive curative power has been so seldom the sub-
ject of litigation; indeed, the Court seemed to invite litigation to
consider the appropriate contours of therapeutic intervention. "
Few legal topics are as fertile for discussion.
8. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNrrY (1971).
9. See generally Goodall, Shapers at Work, 6 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
Nov., 1972, at 53.
10. A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION (1969).
11. V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN (1970); Wexler,
Book Review, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1489 (1972).
12. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE THERAPEUTIC MODEL
Of the multitude of problems associated with the therapeutic
model, the great bulk can be summarized under a single unifying
theme: that the therapeutic approach knows no bounds. If,
through the use of modern scientific techniques, the preven-
tion or cure of deviant behavior is elevated to a superseding
status, all other factors that have long been traditionally em-
bedded in our jurisprudence are by definition dwarfed. This sec-
tion will first consider the problems relating to the absence of
limits in the therapeutic model, and will then discuss other prob-
lems posed by the therapeutic ideal.
A. PROBLEMS OF LIMS
Consider the logical implications of a therapeutic premise to
the effect that, with respect to deviants, "the law should not be
concerned with questions of guilt and its degrees nor with
measuring a fit punishment, but should humanely apply what-
ever measures are necessary to protect society from further trans-
gressions by the same individual"' 4  Actually, the premise is
even broader, for it would include therapeutic prevention as well
as correction, and would apply to the eradication of self-harming
as well as society-harming conduct. The ramifications of the
limitless premise--and the opportunities for abuse--are startling:
1. Substantive Standards
First of all, the scope of conduct theoretically subject to state
control and correction is potentially enormous. It has been
demonstrated, for example, that even such standard tests as be-
ing "mentally ill and dangerous to oneself or others" or being
"mentally ill and in need of care, custody or treatment" are fre-
quently worthless as concrete or even general guidelines. A con-
cept such as "abnormality" has many possible meanings--
including statistical deviation, improper bio-medical functioning,
ideological deviation, and less than optimal psychological ad-
justment--and "mental abnormality" is, definitionally, no more
clear-cut:
One need only glance at the diagnostic manual of the
American Psychiatric Association to learn what an elastic con-
cept mental illness is. It ranges from the massive functional in-
hibition characteristic of one form of catatonic schizophrenia
to those seemingly slight aberrancies associated with an emo-
14. N. Knmrn, supra note 1, at 29.
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tionally unstable personality, but which are so close to conduct
in which we all engage as to define the entire continuum in-
volved. Obviously, the definition of mental illness is left
largely to the user and is dependent upon the norms of adjust-
ment that he employs. Usually the use of the phrase "mental
illness" effectively masks the actual norms being applied. And,
because of the unavoidably ambiguous generalities in which
the American Psychiatric Association describes its diagnostic
categories, the diagnostician has the ability to shoehorn into the
mentally diseased class almost any person he wishes, for what-
ever reason, to put there.'5
Nor is the inherent vagueness of the term "mental illness"
saved by the ordinary additional requirement that, to be com-
mitted, a person must also be dangerous or in need of care or
treatment. Danger-to-others can run the gamut from a serious
risk of homicide, through a propensity to drive carelessly, to
simply offending the sensibilities of others. Indeed, one court
found a probable "check bouncer" dangerous to others.' 0 Dan-
ger-to-self need by no means be restricted to the risk of suicide,
but could easily be broadened to encompass other physical harm,
"loss of assets from foolish expenditures, or even loss of social
standing or reputation from behaving peculiarly in the presence
of others."' 7 And the need-for-care-or-treatment test obviously
provides no real constraint on the exercise of therapeutic power,
for, almost by definition, many experts would hold that all per-
sons who are mentally ill or otherwise deviant are in need of
some sort of supervision or treatment.
The essential problem with regard to substantive standards,
then, is their inherent elasticity. (Indeed, the elasticity is
heightened by the therapeutic model's abandonment of Bec-
caria's "overt act" requirement. If deviance can be offset by
therapy, the argument runs, there is little reason to await the
commission of a deviant act before intervening, especially if in-
tervention could prevent the deviant act. If a manic can be pre-
vented from squandering his assets, why allow him to squander
them prior to treatment?) The elasticity of the standards,
however, coupled with a pressure to intervene and treat when-
ever that appears possible, enables the therapeutic state to coerce
conformity in many instances where coercion is not essential for
societal protection.
The fears of the therapeutic state overstepping its bounds are
15. Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil
Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. Rsv. 75, 80 (1968).
16. United States v. Charnizon, 232 A.2d 586 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
17. Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 15, at 83.
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not simply speculative or academic. In a somewhat different
context, Professor John Kaplan has warned us to scrutinize care-
fully any legal scheme ostensibly designed to protect against
self-harming conduct, for those situations are often ones where
the self-harming conduct is also regarded as immoral, and the
real purpose of the legal control may be to enforce a dominant
morality or to stigmatize and control unpopular groups. s The
most frightening example, uncovered by Dr. Thomas Szasz,1' is a
medical theory published by a Southern doctor in 1851 describ-
ing two diseases--"drapetomania" and "dysaesthesia Aethiopis"
-peculiar to the Negro race. Stripped of medical rhetoric, drape-
tomania described a syndrome of a Negro slave escaping from his
white master, while dysaethesia Aethiopis described a slave's
behavior in neglecting his work!
Modern examples of therapeutic excesses are by no means
uncommon. An elderly man who, instead of preserving his es-
tate for his heirs, decides to spend his later years travelling
and buying expensive gifts for a young girlfriend, may well find
himself under guardianship or commitment as the result of pro-
ceedings initiated by his potential heirs alleging his "senility,"
his "mental incompetence," and his "abnormal spending habits." o2 0
It is clear, too, that some persons-such as "hippies"-have been
declared mentally ill and committed because of their uncon-
ventional life style or beliefs.2 1 Finally, with some psychoana-
lysts contending that members of the John Birch Society may in
fact be paranoid schizophrenics, 2 2 we may not be as far as we
would like to think from the supposed Soviet practice of confining
nonconformist intellectuals and political dissidents in mental
hospitals.23 In that connection, it is perhaps not terribly surpris-
ing that liberals and extreme conservatives are equally concerned
about abuses of the therapeutic state, and that
[n]ot long after a representative of the New York Civil Liber-
ties Union testified before Congress that involuntary civil com-
mitment should be abolished or at least sharply curtailed, ...
18. Kaplan, The Role of the Law in Drug Control, 1971 Du=a L.J.
1065, 1071-72.
19. Szasz, The Sane Slave: An Historical Note on the Use of Medi-
cal Diagnosis as Justificatory Rhetoric, 25 AM. J. PsYCHOTHERAPY 228
(1971).
20. Note, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianship:
Have the Elderly Freedom to Spend?, 73 YALE L.J. 676 (1964).
21. In re Sealy, 218 So. 2d 765 (Fla. App. 1969); Wexler, Scoville,
et al., The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in
Arizona, 13 ARIz. L. REv. 1, 20 (1971).
22. Dallas Morning News, May 1, 1972, at 2D, col 1.
23. Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 6, 1971, at 5A.
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conservative Arizonans, concerned over the possible involuntary
commitment of persons for political and religious beliefs, con-
vinced like-minded legislators to call for legislation which, if
enacted, "would have required the examination of all persons
being committed to the hospital by two physicians, including
one who was a member of the American Association for the Ab-
olition of Involuntary Mental Hospitalization. '24
2. Treatment
According to the therapeutic premise, once a deviant becomes
subject to coercive state control, it is axiomatic that the period
of such control or confinement must be indefinite-for as long
as is necessary to effectuate a "cure." Moreover, with respect to
therapy itself, it follows that the behavioral experts ought to be
entitled to employ whatever therapeutic devices are called for in
order to alleviate the deviant condition. Interestingly, even
within the context of the penal system, Chief Justice Burger has
apparently advocated a system in which "the 'guilty' defendant
could be committed by the trial judge to the custody of the govern-
ment for an indeterminate period for such medical treatment,
psychiatric therapy, discipline, and vocational training as would
help him and rehabilitate and restore him to a useful life. '2
Importantly, however, modern day treatment is not con-
fined to traditional "talk" psychotherapy, which apparently
works well with intelligent and educated neurotics, but is far
from fruitful when used with inarticulate, lower class deviants.
The newer therapies-which are not dependent upon a communi-
cative relationship between the "client" and the therapist-are
derived principally from psychological theories of learning and
from developments in neurology.
The psychologically-derived therapies can take the form of
"positive control"-where appropriate behaviors are rewarded or
"reinforced," often by the use of points or tokens that can later be
exchanged for desired objects such as snacks and cigarettes-or
they can take the form of "aversive control"-where undesirable
behaviors are associated with or followed by unpleasant con-
ditions, such as where "two hospitalized narcotic addicts were
made nauseous following a 'fix' with morphine by the adminis-
tration of apomorphine [an emetic] during thirty-eight treatment
24. Wexler, Scoville, et al., supra note 21, at 242.
25. Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?"
"Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL.
L. REv. 616, 617 (1972).
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sessions conducted over a period of five weeks."2 0  The theory
underlying the psychological therapies is, of course, that reward-
earning behavior will increase and that behavior associated
with or producing aversive conditions will be extinguished. 27
The neurological theories, on the other hand, postulate that much
deviant and violent behavior is attributable to brain disease, cor-
rectable either by anti-seizure medication or by brain surgery.28
While these therapies offer new hope for reforming deviants
who may prove refractory to conventional techniques, there are,
of course, serious questions about whether the new methods ought
to be inflicted upon involuntary patients and, indeed, whether
our concerns for matters of dignity, humaneness, and human per-
sonality ought to preclude their use. A discussion of the new
techniques in the context of each of the above values should help
clarify the issues.
a. Dignity
It might be thought that schemes of "positive control," inso-
far as they simply reward appropriate behavior and do not resort
to punishments, would pose few problems. Actually, however,
even this "mildest" form of modern therapy is open to serious
criticism. That is because some such schemes utilize as rewards,
and require patients to earn, items and activities that basic prin-
ciples of dignity--and of law2 9-would demand as a matter of
absolute, non-contingent right.
For instance, a system of positive control at Patton State
Hospital in San Bernadino, California, starts all its patients in an
orientation group, where they are required to exhibit proper be-
havior-such as efficient work habits-in order to earn tokens
which can later be used to purchase wanted items. If a patient
successfully adjusts to the orientation group, he can be elevated
to a better environment. A psychiatric technician connected
with the program described it as follows:
This group sleeps in a relatively unattractive dormitory which
conforms to bare minimums set by the state department of men-
tal hygiene. There are no draperies at the windows or spreads
on the beds, and the beds themselves are of the simplest kind.
In the dining room the patient sits with many other patients at a
26. Schwitzgebel, Limitations on the Coercive Treatment of Of-
fenders, 8 Cnnvr L. BuLL. 267, 286 (1972).
27. See generally A. BAxWuRA, supra note 10.
28. See generally V. MARK & F. Eavrn, supra note 11.
29. Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification, Token Econ-
omies, and the Law, 61 CALIF. L. Rnv. 81 (1973).
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long table, crowded in somewhat uncomfortably. The only eat-
ing utensil given him is a large spoon. The food is served in un-
attractive, sectioned plastic dishes. So long as he is in this
group, he is not allowed to wear his own clothes and cannot
go to activities which other patients are free to attend off the
unit. He may not have permission for off-the-ground visits,
and the number of visitors who can see him are [sic] restricted.
During this time, the patient learns that his meals, his bed,
his toilet articles, and his clothes no longer are freely given
him. He must pay for these with tokens. . . . These tokens pay
for all those things normally furnished and often taken for
granted. In the orientation group most of the things the pa-
tient wants are cheap; for example, it costs one token to be per-
mitted to go to bed, one token for a meal. Patients find it easy
enough to earn the few tokens necessary for bare subsistence.8 0
While these systems of "token economies" have been used
principally with chronic psychotics,3 1 they have been employed
also with populations of narcotic addicts,8 2 alcoholics, 8  juve-
nile delinquents,8 ' and others.8 5 Of course, not all of these pro-
grams of "positive" control resort to the type of deprivations
used to motivate chronic psychotics at Patton State Hospital,
but there is a real possibility that, if the therapeutic state is not
carefully scrutinized, the type of system described above might
be extended even to nonpsychotic clinical populations. Indeed,
one program instituted with nonpsychotic alcoholics closely re-
sembled the Patton State Hospital model.80
b. Humaneness
If "positive" control is the mildest of the new therapies, then
we can well expect to encounter some serious problems with
techniques that are admittedly "aversive." Under the Eighth
Amendment, cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden.
Should the matter stand on a different footing if the motivation
for inflicting the "highly unpleasant" condition is curative rather
30. Bruce, Tokens for Recovery, 66 AM. J. NuRsING 1799, 1800-01
(1966).
31. T. AYLLON & N. AziNn, THI. TOKEN EcoNoMY: A MOTIVATIONAL
SYsTEm FOR THERAPY AND REHABILITATION (1968).
32. Glicksman, Ottomanelli & Cutler, The Earn-Your-Way Credit
System: Use of a Token Economy in Narcotic Rehabilitation, 6 INT'L J.
OF THE ADDICTIONS 525 (1971).
33. Narrol, Experimental Application of Reinforcement Principles
to the Analysis and Treatment of Hospitalized Alcoholics, 28 Q.J. STUD-
IES ON ALCOHOL 105 (1967).
34. Schwitzgebel, Limitations on the Coercive Treatment of Of-
fenders, 8 CmiM. L. BULL. 267 (1972).
35. Kazdin & Bootzin, The Token Economy: An Evaluative Review,
5 J. APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 343 (1972).
36. See generally Narrol, supra note 33.
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than retributive? Arguably, according to the orthodox thera-
peutic model, such techniques would be permissible notwith-
standing their aversive nature and notwithstanding the fact
that the aversive condition imposed is out-of-proportion to the
crime or deviant act committed.
To appreciate the fact that therapeutic schemes ought not to
be immune from "cruel and unusual"-type restrictions, one need
only consider the use of "Anectine" or "succinylcholine" therapy.
Anectine is a muscle relaxant drug "that rapidly produces com-
plete paralysis of the skeletal muscles, including those which
control respiration."37 It has been used therapeutically in aver-
sion therapy. For example, attempts have been made to condi-
tion alcoholics against drinking by administering the drug just
prior to offering the alcoholic a drink; then, "[j]ust as the patient
is about to drink the alcohol, paralysis occurs, producing great
fright about being unable to breathe and a fear of suffocation. '3
Anectine therapy has also been administered to disruptive in-
mates in California institutions, sometimes without their consent.
In one such institution, the practice was
to administer 20 to 40 mg. of Succinylcholine intravenously
with oxygen and an airway available, and to counsel the pa-
tient while he is under the influence of the drug that his behavior
is dangerous to others or to himself, that it is desirable that he
stop the behavior in question, and that subsequent behavior of a
nature which may be dangerous to others or to himself will be
treated with similar aversive treatments. 39
The procedure is strikingly similar to that portrayed in A Clock-
work Orange.40
c. Human Personality
Probably the greatest threat to human personality is posed
by emerging techniques of psychosurgery-the "new lobotomies"
used to rectify violence-producing brain pathology resulting
from heredity, birth injuries, head injuries, viral infections, and
other causes. According to the "new neurology," if brain pathol-
ogy taking the form of abnormal electrical activity cannot be
corrected by anti-seizure medication, surgery may be required.'1
The traditional surgical procedure has been lobectomy-the re-
moval of the front portion of the diseased temporal lobe. A
37. Schwitzgebel, Limitations on the Coercive Treatment of Of-fenders, 8 CpmvL L. BuLL. 267, 279 (1972).
38. Id.
39. Note, supra note 25, at 635-36.
40. A. BuRaGss, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962).
41. See generally V. MARK & F. EvnT, supra note 11.
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more modern technique, however, is stereotactic surgery, which
involves, through the use of a surgical drill and other special
instruments, implanting electrodes in the brain, determining
through stimulation and recording procedures which brain cells
are misfiring, and destroying a small number of cells in a pre-
cisely determined area by passing a heat-generating current
through the appropriate electrode.42
While some scientists speak of psychosurgery principally in
cases of uncontrollable violence, 48 its potential is by no means that
restrictive. Already, it has been reported that the California De-
partment of Corrections toyed with the idea of brain cauteriza-
tion for inmates who were serious management problems, 44 and
elsewhere, "[h]omosexuals have allegedly been turned straight
. . . through destruction of part of the brain called Cajal's nu-
cleus-the supposed 'sexual switchboard.' ' 45 In Mississippi,
moreover, hyperactive children as young as five years old have
been subjected to psychosurgery, 46 and the possibilities seem end-
less. For example, one explanation of drug addiction is that self-
medication is a response to a neurological disorder of the brain's
pleasure center, presumably correctable by neurosurgery. 47
As expected, a therapy as drastic as psychosurgery has pro-
duced its share of enraged critics. Probably the most outspoken
is Dr. Peter R. Breggin, a psychiatrist who has investigated
current psychosurgical practices and who has reviewed the vo-
luminous literature.48 Breggin is not simply unconvinced about
psychosurgery's assumed beneficial effects, but he strongly be-
lieves, from his review of the evidence, that "[a]t best, it [psy-
chosurgery] blunts the individual, and at worst, it destroys all
his highest capacities." 49 Inevitably, according to Breggin, psy-
chosurgery affects not only the precise area destroyed, but, as
even certain neurosurgeons admit, also affects other functions
performed by the brain-creativity, introspection, concentration,
independence. In short, in destroying the patient's deviance,
Breggin claims it also destroys the patient's "identity" and
,,self."5
42. Wexler, Book Review, 85 HARv. L. Rha. 1489, 1492 (1972).
43. See generally V. MARK & F. ERVmN supra note 11.
44. Weiner, The Clockwork Cure, TH NATON, April 3, 1972, at 433.
45. Note, supra note 25, at 633.
46. Breggin, The Return of Lobotomy and Psychosurgery, 118
CONG. REc. E1602 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1972).
47. Id.
48. Id. See also Breggin, Psychosurgery for the Control of Vio-
lence, 118 CONG. REC. E3380 (daily ed. March 30, 1972).
49. Breggin, The Return of Lobotomy and Psychosurgery, 118 CONG.
REc. E1602, E1610 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1972).
50. Id.
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3. Control over Non-Deviant Actors
Under the retributive theory of criminal law, it will be
recalled, individual responsibility and moral blameworthiness
were the kingpins of state control and punishment. Ferri's de-
terministic incursion into the criminal justice system, however,
called into question the concept of the deviant actor's culpability
and responsibility. Ferri called for dealing with the deviant as
the product of deterministic forces, and for treating him accord-
ingly, which has become the foundation for the modern day thera-
peutic model But logically, the jurisdiction of the therapeutic
state should not be restricted even to the broad limits set by Ferr
If a deviant is not truly responsible for his own behavior, it may
be that, in many cases, his behavior problem cannot be dealt with
effectively by therapy directed solely at him. Modern social sci-
ence theory recognizes that actors are not behaviorally autono-
mous, and that an individual's deviant behavior may well be at-
tributable to actions of other parties. If the deviance is to be
eradicated, then, some sort of therapeutic control may have to be
exercised over those other parties.
Perhaps the clearest example of aberrant behavior resulting
from interpersonal interaction can be seen in the area of family
relations. Almost twenty years ago, for example, Johnson and
Szurek postulated that "parents' unwitting sanction or indirect
encouragement is a major cause of, and the specific stimulus for,
such antisocial behavior as fire-setting, stealing, truancy, and
unacceptable sexuality displayed by young delinquents .... 51
And in a provocative critique of legal education for, among other
things, ignoring the interdisciplinary dimensions of the law, Sa-
voy raises the pertinent question in a somewhat broader con-
text:
We know, for example, that most homicides do not occur in the
street, but in the home, and not between strangers, but betveen
people who are close to each other. This suggests that homicide
may be a symptom of dysfunctional patterns of interaction
within a family, and that the subject of investigation and treat-
ment ought to be the potentially homicidal family rather than a
class of dangerous individual offenders. Similarly, an act of
"juvenile delinquency," from an interactional perspective, may
be viewed as a situation in which the juvenile is being "scape-
goated" and is expressing an upset or disequilibrium within
the entire family as a social unit. The delinquent act "can be
looked upon as the only 'safe' way of calling attention to an in-
tolerable family situation," or it may ultimately be an effort to
51. Johnson & Szurek, Etiology of Antisocial Behavior in Delin-
quents and Psychopaths, 154 J.A.MLA. 814 (1954).
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preserve self by leaving the family.
What implications would an interactional analysis of mental
illness have for a legal order that authorizes the institutionaliza-
tion of one member of a dysfunctional family on the petition
of another? And what new problems are raised for "rehabili-
tation" models of control over individual conduct if we dis-
cover ... that efforts to reintegrate the "identified patient"
back into the family, without treating the entire family as afamily may be disastrous because the family has a vested in-
terest in keeping the patient "sick"? 52
At this time, the interactional approach to the control of
crime and deviance is virtually foreign to our legal system. Apart
from the remotely related area of criminal liability of parents for
failure to control their children,53 the one exception, present in
some of the juvenile court acts, empowers a juvenile court, un-
der certain circumstances, to issue an order regulating a par-
ent or guardian, and requiring him to perform-or to refrain
from performing-certain acts. 54  Conceivably, such authority
could be invoked to encourage-or compel-a parent to help mold
appropriate behavior in his child by requiring the parent to dis-
pense certain reinforcers contingent upon proper behavior by
the juvenile.5 5
Beyond the issuance to parents of care and protection orders
by some juvenile courts, however, our legal system has not at-
tempted to control non-deviant actors. Even in the area of men-
tal health law, for example, where interspousal tensions and
frictions frequently lead to the emotional distress or commitment
of one of the partners, commitment courts are not presently
authorized to require the non-patient partner to submit to coun-
seling or to cooperate in the recovery of the patient.
Conceptually, however, the therapeutic premise might man-
date forcible cooperation of the non-patient spouse in order to
rehabilitate the deviant actor, and as the interactional perspec-
tive of deviance gains wider acceptance, we can probably expect
to see pressure exerted to enlarge the personal jurisdiction of the
52. Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE
L.J. 444, 497-99 (1970).
53. Note, Criminal Liability of Parents for Failure to Control Their
Children, 6 VALPAR1iso L. REV. 332 (1972).
54. S. Fox, THE LAw OF JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 223-25
(1971).
55. R. THARP & R. WETZEL, BEHAVIOR MODIFICArION IN THE NATURAL
ENVIRONMENT (1969); Thorne, Tharp & Wetzel, Behavior Modification
Techniques: New Tools for Probation Officers, 31 FED. PROB. 21 (June
1967).
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therapeutic state. Moreover, logically speaking, the control of
non-actors for the purpose of avoiding or correcting deviance
can extend beyond family bounds, and drawing appropriate
limits to restrict the therapeutic state ought to become a real prob-
lem. To what extent, for example, should school teachers, who
are perhaps at the root of a great deal of truancy on the part
of pupils, be susceptible to legal and therapeutic control?
4. Procedure
Under the model of classical criminal justice, where punish-
ment is inflicted in part according to a retributive rationale, the
accused is theoretically entitled to every advantage. The depri-
vation of liberty for the purpose of punishment is considered so
drastic a measure that there is general agreement that the crim-
inal law ought to be applied sparingly, and that the criminal pen-
alty ought to be imposed only after an adversary proceeding
at which the accused is represented by competent counsel, and
at which he is entitled to a panoply of other protections, some
of which were catalogued by Jeffrie Murphy, a legal philosopher,
in connection with reviewing Karl Menninger's therapeuti-
cally-oriented book, The Crime of Punishment:5 0
Our system of criminal due process involves such guarantees
as the following: (1) No man is to be deprived of his liberty
for what he is or what he might do, but only because he has in
fact violated some legal prohibition. This is the traditional
requirement for an overt act. (2) A man is to be presumed in-
nocent. This means that the state must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury of the defendant's peers and that the
defendant may exploit the adversary system to its full to make
such proof impossible. (3) A man is to be responsible only
for what he has done as an individual. He is not to be held
guilty because others like him often commit crimes. (4) A
man is not to be forced to testify against himself, to help the
state in its attempt to deprive him of his liberty.57
Murphy goes on to note, however, that "such guarantees
would have no place in a purely therapeutic or preventive con-
text, and Menninger quite correctly argues that the procedures
they involve are not the best way to arrive at truth and thus that
they interfere with the efficiency of securing public safety."""
Indeed, the argument for relaxing procedural safeguards can be
made even stronger: Where the state's aim is not to punish but to
assist by providing therapy, there is no need for an adversary
56. K. MENNmGm, THE Canvm oF PUNIsHMENT (1968).
57. Murphy, Criminal Punishment and Psychiatric Fallacies, 4 LAw
& Soc. REv. 111, 115 (1969).
58. Id.
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process because all parties have the best interest of the deviant
at heart. And, the argument continues, the criminal law safe-
guards have no place in a therapeutic proceeding, for they serve
only to "criminalize" the process and further stigmatize the
subject, and they are simply unnecessary impediments to achiev-
ing the central goal, which is to help the deviant actor. The most
extreme conclusion, of course, is that the entire question is sim-
ply a medical or scientific matter, and that the courts have no
business at all meddling in these need-for-hospitalization deci-
sions.
By and large, although the winds of change are now stirring,
the therapeutic argument has generally been accepted with re-
spect to the "civil" commitment of deviants, and American law
thus has two parallel but very different procedural systems for
controlling aberrant behavior-a criminal system with a host
of procedural rights and a therapeutic system with very few.
Although existing narcotic addict commitment schemes have
been sharply criticized for their failure to provide sufficient
safeguards,5 9 legal protections available to addicts far surpass
those available to other deviants subject to civil commitment.
Until 1967, when the Supreme Court intervened to alter the prac-
tice,60 for example, juveniles in delinquency proceedings were not
entitled to counsel or to a privilege against self-incrimination.
And even today, mental commitment procedures generally follow
the therapeutic model-often to the extreme conclusion that the
question of hospitalization ought simply to be a medical de-
termination.
In many states, for example, the patient is not entitled to
counsel,61 and even when attorneys are involved, they generally
do not properly understand their role, 2 and the hearings,
which ordinarily are not transcribed, often consume no more than
five minutes, 63 whereupon the patient may be ordered committed
for an indefinite period. Moreover, several states follow the
purely medical model and permit commitment solely on the
basis of medical certificates, without any court intervention at
59. Note, Due Process for the Narcotic Addict? The New York
Compulsory Commitment Procedures, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1172 (1968).
60. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
61. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 125-27 (2d ed. S. Brakel &
R. Rock (eds.) 1971).
62. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 424 (1966).
63. Wexler, Scoville, et al., supra note 21, at 39.
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all, although the patient will be able to challenge his confinement
in court after being committed if he requests a judicial hearing. 4
B. OTHER PROBLEMS
Most of the problems thrust to the surface by the thera-
peutic model are, as we have seen, problems regarding the
"illimitable" therapeutic premise. There are, however, cer-
tain other questions raised by the model-most of which are
highly conjectural and subject to empirical inquiry-that seem
to be worthy of some mention. Chiefly, these are the possible
sociological and psychological implications of a societal shift
from a punitive to a therapeutic model In that regard, it is in-
teresting to note that the process of divestment of criminal
justice has taken hold at a time when we still know very little
about the role played by criminal punishment in satisfying the
public's need for retribution and in preventing and correcting
crime.
Thus, while it seems that a psychology of determinism
undercuts the notion of blameworthiness and accordingly calls
into question the propriety of retribution on moral grounds, retri-
butive punishment may nonetheless have utility on sociological
grounds. Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in Furman v. Georgia,"5
put the matter nicely:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice
serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a
society governed by law. When people begin to believe that or-
ganized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal
offenders the punishment they "deserve," then there are sown
the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch
law.
The "urge to punish,"' 68 in short, may be an important ingre-
dient of our traditional legal system. Although subject to a vari-
ety of possible explanations, a recent study of governmental sys-
tems at "Achievement Place," a family-style home for pre-delin-
quent boys, may shed some empirical light on the dimensions of
the urge to punish-and to be punished.17 Achievement Place
experimented with various governmental models of peer be-
64. N. KrrinE, THE RGBT TO BE DnERENs: DsvzA~cs N EN-
FORcED THERAPY 73 (1971).
65. 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972).
66. I. WEiHOFEN, Tbs URGE TO PUmSH (1956).
67. Phillips, Wolf & Fixsen, An Experimental Analysis of Govern-
mental Systems at Achievement Place, A Group Home for Pre-Delin-
quent Boys, J. APPLim BEHAWvoR AwALYsis (forthcoming).
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havioral control. These included systems where a "peer manager"
could dispense only rewards (points convertible into privileges)
for conforming conduct, and systems where the manager could
not only reward conforming conduct but could also punish (sub-
tract points) for deviant conduct. The research disclosed many
interesting findings regarding the punitive process. For in-
stance, when the peer managership position was purchasable,
the boys were willing to pay far more points to occupy that posi-
tion when it carried the authority to punish as well as to reward
as opposed to when it carried only the authority to reward. More-
over, although the boys at large preferred an elected managership,
they most preferred an elected managership system where the
manager would have the authority to punish as well as to reward.
However the Achievement Place results are ultimately in-
terpreted, it seems that principles of punishment are now part-
and-parcel of our governmental fabric. Leaders expect to be
able to punish nonconforming conduct and the public expects-
and desires-that rule-breaking behavior will be punished. It is
possible, then, that a shift away from punishment and toward
therapy may produce some problematic repercussions. If
the therapy administered is not, in a retributive sense, "propor-
tionate" to the crime or act of deviance committed, the urge to
punish may find expression in extra-legal ways, or perhaps will
manifest itself indirectly by resort to cruel therapies-such as
anectine treatment. It is possible, too, that the public may be of-
fended by criminals receiving less than their "due," and that
this may eventually lead to a widespread relaxation of inhibitions
and a consequent increase in deviant behavior.08 Possibly, of
course, the existing "urge to punish" may be more cultural than
inherent, and it may accordingly be subject to eventual modifi-
cation or elimination. 69 But even if so, there will surely be a long
transitional period during which the problems of dispensing with
a retributive outlet may arise, and shapers of the therapeutic
state must be sensitive to those issues.
A related problem concerns the concept of deterrence in a
changing legal order. Unfortunately, our existing knowledge
about deterrence is woefully inadequate.70 Many proponents of a
therapeutic paradigm assert that deterrence obviously does not
68. Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 949 (1966).
69. See H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 66.
70. See Andenaes, supra note 68; Chappel, Geis & Hardt, Explora-
tions in Deterrence and Criminal Justice, 8 Cium. L. BULL. 514 (1972).
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work, as evidenced by high rates of crime and of recidivism. But
that argument misses the mark, for it does not negate the possi-
bility that those rates would be higher still under a therapeutic
model.
The therapeutic state is technically unconcerned with mat-
ters of general deterrence. Periods of incarceration, for exam-
ple, are not set according to schedules that will deter others from
transgressing. Instead, treatment is theoretically indefinite in
length, so that the deviant can be released as soon as he responds
to therapy. And even when the therapy is unpleasant to the pa-
tient, the underlying motivation is not to set an example. As
Ralph Schwitzgebel has put it, "aversion therapy is not the same
as 'punishment' in the broad sense of social retribution or general
deterrence. Although the procedures used are aversive, they are
justified only by therapeutic efficacy, not by a theory of retribu-
tion or general deterence."7'
Conceivably, then, with deterrence and retribution relaxed,
the therapeutic arrangement may actually encourage more de-
viance than the criminal system. On the other hand, precisely
the opposite result may obtain. If aversion therapy is widely em-
ployed-and especially if it is given wider legal latitude than is
given to traditional criminal punishment-deviance may be in-
creasingly deterred. Further, the specter of indefinite confine-
ment and treatment-the "certainty of uncertain severity"-may
well be distasteful enough to deter deviants to an extent greater
than they would be deterred by the prospect of set sentences, par-
ticularly if the average length of therapeutic confinement proves
to be substantial. Surely, if the disinclination of defendants to
raise the insanity defense (because of the possibility of indefinite
institutionalization) 72 or if the dislike by prisoners of indetermi-
nate sentencing 73 are any indication, the prospect of therapeutic
commitment may indeed be sufficiently unpleasant so as to op-
erate as a strong deterrent. But while these matters of deter-
rence are subject to endless speculation, they are, of course,
answerable only by research, which ought to be viewed as an
ingredient essential to effective therapeutic planning.
A final, closely related question, again answerable defini-
tively only through research, is the extent to which the therapeu-
71. Schwitzgebel, Book Review, 36 FED. PRoB. 66 (March 1972).
72. A. GoLmsmN, THE INsANITY DFENSE 24 (1967).
73. Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CAir. L. Rlv.
343 (1968).
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tic processing of deviants will affect their life-chances, their self-
concept, and their subsequent conduct. Comparatively speaking,
for example, it may be that the stigma of a therapeutic label is
a greater hindrance to the affected deviant than is the stigma of
a criminal conviction.
Thus far, we have only assumptions, not facts, about this
problem. Consider, for example, the dissenting remarks of Mr.
Justice Clark in Robinson v. California: "Any reliance upon the
'stigma' of a misdemeanor conviction in this context is mis-
placed, as it would hardly be different from the stigma of a civil
commitment for narcotics addiction. '7 4 But Justice Clark has no
factual support for his conclusion, and we simply do not know
whether an addict will be stigmatized-and hence hindered in his
social readjustment-more by a criminal conviction, a commit-
ment as an addict, or, as is still possible in a number of states,
a commitment as a person who is mentally ill. 7 5 Yet, answers to
these questions are crucial in charting an appropriate thera-
peutic course. The little we do know about the area is interest-
ing indeed. We know, for instance, that former mental patients
who present themselves to prospective employers as having
been hospitalized because of "problems in living" receive a far
better response than those who present themselves as having
had "mental problems.17 0 The two labels, in fact, yield com-
pletely different lines of inquiry on the part of the prospective
employers.77 We know, too, that many individuals strenuously
resist therapeutic labels. Alcoholics, for example, resist "mental
illness" labels,78 as do many homosexuals. At the annual con-
vention of the American Psychiatric Association held in Dallas,
Texas, in May, 1972, activist members of the gay community dis-
tributed a sheet entitled "Gay, Proud and Healthy," and protested
the prevailing psychiatric theory that homosexuals are mentally
ill:
Central to the conflict between psychiatry and the homosex-
ual community is the "sickness theory" of homosexuality and
the whole related complex of negative attitudes toward homo-
sexuality, which try to make of homosexuality something in-
ferior to and less desirable than heterosexuality. It matters not
74. 370 U.S. 660, 683 n.1 (1962).
75. N. KIT'rIE, supra note 64, at 236.
76. Rothaus, Hanson, Cleveland & Johnson, Describing Psychiatric
Hospitalization: A Dilemma, 18 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 85 (1963).
77. Rothaus & Hanson, The Path of Inquiry in Mental Illness and
Problem Centered Self-Description, 1 COMMUN. MENT. HEALTH J. 29
(1965).
78. N. KITT=x, supra note 64, at xvii.
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whether the word used be sickness, disorder, affliction, dis-
turbance, dysfunction, neurosis, immaturity, fixation, character
or personality disorder, pathology, or any other-or whether
homosexuality be considered as merely symptomatic of these
-the effects are the same: (1) To support and buttress the
prejudices of society and to assist the bigots in the perpetration
and perpetuation of their bigotry; and, at least equally im-
portant (2) To destroy the homosexual's self-confidence and self-
esteem, impair his or her self-image, degrade his or her basic
human dignity.
The quoted homosexual grievance indicates that the particu-
lar label attached to a deviant-juvenile delinquent, criminal,
addict, mentally ill-is important not only with respect to the pro-
cedure it calls for, the treatment it yields, and the stigma it pro-
duces, but also with respect to the related question of its in-
fluence on the deviant's self-concept and later behavior.70 It is
known, for example, that the very process of societal reaction
against a deviant or the very act of labeling him deviant can op-
erate to alter his self-concept and behavior. In that connection,
Freedman and Doob80 demonstrated empirically one impact of a
deviant label by conducting a social psychology experiment with
normal students solicited ostensibly to submit to a "personality"
test. Their findings have been summarized as follows:
Freedman and Doob experimentally induced a feeling of devi-
ance in some of the subjects by informing a random group that
they had received personality test scores far from the "aver-
age". Then, other experiments were performed to assess the
impact of the deviant label. Interestingly, the investigators
learned that when the personality test results were not made
public, the "deviants", in an apparent attempt to conceal their
deviancy, preferred to work alone. The desire to avoid close
contact with others disappeared, however, when the test results
were made public, but the deviants then preferred to associate
with the other experimentally manufactured deviants rather
than with the nondeviant subjects.8 1
Of particular pertinence to the impact of labeling under the
therapeutic model is that the therapeutic premise attributes devi-
ancy to causes other than individual responsibility. Conse-
quently, it is not uncommon for deviants, borrowing from the
language of psychiatry and related disciplines, to develop a "vo-
cabulary of motives" for lawless behavior that includes a denial of
personal responsibility and an attribution of their aberrant
behavior to causes beyond their control -8 2 More important,
79. E. ScHun, LABELING Dvwrr BEHAVoR: ITS SOCIOLOGICAL IM-
PLICATIONS (1971).
80. 3. FREEDiTAN & A. DooB, DEVIANCY: THE PsYcHoLoGy OF BEING
DIFFEsmRE (1968).
81. Wexler, Book Review, 85 HAYv. L. REV. 1489, 1490 n.9 (1972).
82. F. HArTuNG, CRIMs, LAw AND Socmrv (1965); Sykes & Matza,
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perhaps, is the fact that the denial of personal responsibility is
accompanied by a self-concept that accepts a lack of self-con-
trol, and the altered self-image can in turn lead to increased de-
viance.8 3
Rotter has performed some interesting research on behavioral
correlates of "perceptions of causality. '8 4 He has developed a
scheme for classifying individuals as believing in "internal" con-
trol or in "external" control. In short, internals believe they
control their own destinies, whereas externals attribute cau-
sation to outside forces. Rotter notes that views regarding in-
ternal and external control can be culturally derived, as evi-
denced by the Ute Indian tradition of relying heavily on fate as
a causal explanation. Most significant, in connection with the
emerging therapeutic model, is Rotter's finding that internals
really are more effective than are externals in altering their en-
vironments and in controlling themselves. For instance, "in-
ternal inmates in a reformatory learned more than external
inmates did about the reformatory rules, parole laws, and the
long-range economic facts that would help one get along in the
outside world. '8 5 A related finding-with possible significance
for the field of addiction-is that, after the release of the Surgeon
General's report regarding the hazards of tobacco, internals were
apparently better able than were externals to give up smoking.8 0
It may be, of course, that Rotter's findings are not pertinent
to the topic at hand. Conceivably, externals come to believe in
external causation because they are repeatedly unable to change
themselves or their environment, rather than vice versa. But,
particularly when combined with other findings,8 7 it is perfectly
plausible to assume that a belief in external causality may, of
its own force, create a situation where an individual becomes less
able to control or change himself.
What all of this suggests for present purposes is that even if
individual responsibility is an illusion,8 it may be dysfunctional
for us to "cease to regard people as agents of dignity and re-
Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 AM. SOCIOL.
REv. 664 (1957).
83. See W. GLASSER, REALiTY THERAPY (1965); F. HARTUNG, supra
note 82.
84. Rotter, External Control and Internal Control, 5 PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, June, 1971, at 37.
85. Id. at 58.
86. Id.
87. See generally W. GLASSER, supra note 83; F. HARTUNG, supra
note 82.
88. See B.F. SKiNNER, supra note 8.
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sponsibility who are capable of being blameworthy for what they
do."89 Glasser views the divestment of responsibility as having
already gone too far, and he has developed a "reality therapy"
that focuses on what the deviant did, without paying attention
to why he did it. 9° But whether or not the problem is yet out of
hand, several writers91 have expressed concern over the long-
range implications of accepting an "illness" or "medical" model
of deviance. Professor Kittrie has summed up the point nicely:
Another potentially undesirable product of the therapeutic
state is the hastening of the erosion of society's reliance upon
the concept of personal responsibility. While the determinists
found no scientific justification for classical criminal law's insis-
tence upon the institution of free will and sought to abolish the
concept of personal guilt, the modern engineers of social organi-
zation cannot overlook the utility of these concepts-even if rec-
ognized to be only fictional and ritualistic-in the promotion of
socially desired behavior. Granting that mental patients, juv-
eniles, addicts, and psychopaths (as well as the rest of the popu-
lace) may in fact never exercise total free will in their social
conduct, cannot society's endorsement of the free-will con-
cept still work toward the enhancement of whatever self-re-
straint the diverse members of these groups might be able to
generate?92
IlI. TOWARD A PROPER PERSPECTIVE
A. GENERAL CONSmERATIONS
As always, it is easier to pose problems than to suggest solu-
tions. To the extent that the process of posing problems sensi-
tizes individuals to the important issues, however, the mere pres-
entation of the issues serves to better the situation. Moreover,
at least some of the problems call for rather simple solutions. The
possible sociological and psychological problems just mentioned,
for example, are admittedly speculative, and a reasonable sug-
gestion for grappling with them would be simply to be cogni-
zant of their possible development, and to focus resources for
research around some of the pertinent social and psychological
implications of a shift to a therapeutically-oriented legal system.
But the other items catalogued above as problems with the
therapeutic model-the problems of the "limitless" therapeu-
tic premise-are far more troubling. To avert those problems,
boundaries must be established, but, as we have seen, the task
89. Murphy, supra note 57, at 121 n.8.
90. See Glasser, supra note 83.
91. N. Kr=, supra note 64, at 46; E. Scar, supra note 79, at
165.
92. N. Krrnuy, supra note 64, at 46.
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of line-drawing, utilizing exclusively a therapeutic model, is vir-
tually impossible. The point, obviously, is that the problems of
an illimitable therapeutic state arise only under a model where
the curative goal is elevated above all others. Matters fall bet-
ter into place, and establishing limits becomes somewhat less dif-
ficult, when it is recognized that there are a multitude of values
other than the prevention and cure of deviant conduct that de-
serve expression, even in a social and legal scheme relating
to the control of deviance.
Actually-and this point is not often enough made in the
context of how far we should go to eliminate deviance-some de-
viance actually promotes social organization or serves other posi-
tive functions. While a "functional analysis" of deviance is
clearly beyond the scope of the present paper, it is worth noting
that deviant conduct serves, among many other things, to accen-
tuate the conformity and cohesiveness of non-deviants, and to
provide a warning about strain in the social structure. With re-
spect to the latter, Albert Cohen has written:
Deviance may also function as a signal light or warning,
inviting attention to defects of organization. Increases in absen-
teeism from work, truancy from school, AWOL's from the army,
runaways and other disturbances in correctional institutions,
surly and sullen compliance with orders, and deliberate defects
of workmanship, may compel re-examination of existing pro-
cedures, reveal unsuspected causes of discontent, and lead to
changes that enhance efficiency and morale. The deviant may,
by sticking his neck out, thereby render a service to reluctant
conformers, who may be subject to the same strains but prefer
to suffer them than to violate the rules. 94
In that connection, incidentally, we should scrutinize carefully
systems of control and treatment that may alleviate symptoms
without correcting underlying causes. If, for example, psy-
chosurgery were performed on violent prison inmates,95 their vio-
lence might be subdued at the expense of exposing and reform-
ing atrocious prison conditions that may have been the root cause
of their violence and rebelliousness. Similarly, but less obvi-
ously, if heroin were to be legally dispensed to relieve narcotic
addicts, we should be careful not to deflect attention from un-
derstanding and correcting those socio-economic conditions that
may be a fertile breeding ground for addiction.0 6
93. A. COHEN, DEVIANCE AND CONTROL 6-11 (1966); E. ScHUn, supra
note 79, at 140-47.
94. A. CoHEN, supra note 93, at 10.
95. See Note, supra note 25.
96. Markham, What's All This Talk of Heroin Maintenance?, Nzw
YoRx TiMSs MAGAZInE, July 2, 1972, at 6.
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But to return to the central point, it should be clear that the
eradication of deviance ought not to be society's superseding goal
Some deviance is indeed more functional than dysfunctional and,
besides, other values-which compete with the elimination and
correction of deviance-are entitled to recognition and are
viewed by many as more important than crime control
Thus, Richard Schwartz97 has described an Israeli commun-
ity where deviant behavior is so well controlled by public opin-
ion and informal social pressure that there is not even a need
for--and there does not exist-a legal mechanism of control re-
sembling a judicial body. But it is highly questionable whether,
in our society, many of us would be willing to sacrifice the pri-
vacy that must be sacrificed in order to make the informal con-
trols function properly. In the Israeli kvutza, for instance, chil-
dren are sensitized to the force of public opinion by living and
playing together, and, even as adults, there is such constant con-
tact with the group-working together, eating meals cafeteria
style, showering in common facilities, living in quarters lacking
privacy-that the public opinion grapevine is rapidly travelled,
and informal disapproval of deviance is easily expressed.
Privacy is only one value that most of us would elevate
above the eradication of deviance. Humaneness is clearly an-
other. Even under the retributive and deterrence oriented
criminal law system, it is true, as Andenaes has noted, that
[i]t was never a principle of criminal justice that crime should
be prevented at all costs. Ethical and social considerations will
always determine which measures are considered "proper". As
Ball has expressed it: "[A] penalty may be quite effective as a
deterrent, yet undesirable." Even if it were possible to prove
that cutting off thieves' hands would effectively prevent theft,
proposals for such practice would scarcely win many adherents
today.98
Surely, the same sort of restraints ought to operate under a thera-
peutic model: therapeutic efficacy ought not to be the exclusive
test of legality. Moreover, legal restrictions will have to be de-
veloped with respect to those therapies deemed by the subjects
to be unpleasant or aversive. This is a particularly compli-
cated area needing more experience and reflection before con-
crete recommendations can be made,99 but certain guidelines
come quickly to mind. Aversive therapies should ordinarily re-
97. Schwartz, Social Factors in the Development of Legal Con-
trol: A Case Study of Two Israeli Settlements, 63 YALE L.J. 471 (1954).
98. Andenaes, supra note 68, at 957.
99. Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification, Token
Economies, and the Law, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 81 (1973).
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quire the informed consent of the patient,10 0 although it is rec-
ognized that the informed consent doctrine will often be difficult
to apply with a population of deviants: many of the deviants
may be mentally impaired, which can affect their capacity to
consent, and even if they have the capacity, the consent may
be coerced in the sense that submission to the treatment might
realistically constitute their only chance for release from cus-
tody; finally, the consent could not be truly "informed" with
respect to therapies which are largely experimental in nature.10 1
Surely, drastic therapies should not be resorted to where less
drastic ones would be clinically sufficient.10 2 And to the extent
that the therapies are in fact experimental, they ought probably
to conform to emerging legal and ethical restrictions regarding
experimentation with human subjects.10
Perhaps even more than the others, liberty is a value cher-
ished in this society. It, too, must therefore be balanced with
the therapeutic premise. In the context of the commitment of
the mentally ill, the point has been made well in the form of a
pertinent question: "[I]s the treatment and cure of the men-
tally ill individual of more benefit to society than the liberty of
which he is deprived and the principle (lost, or tarnished) that
no one should assert the right to control another's beliefs and
responses absent compelling social danger?"' 0 " Finally, respect
for liberty demands adherence to the principle of "less drastic
means"--that commitment and deprivation of liberty not be re-
sorted to if other, less restrictive, treatment alternatives are
available, reasonably effective, and more to the liking of the sub-
ject. 0 5
These and other values, then, will serve as guidelines for
curbing therapeutic jurisdiction. Apart from the limitations
suggested above, the therapeutic model will need to be restricted
100. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
101. Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification, Token Econ-
omies, and the Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 81 (1973); Note, supra note 25,
at 670-73.
102. See Wexler, supra note 101; see also A. BANDURA, PnNcIPLEs
OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION (1969).
103. EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (P. Freund (ed).
1970); J. KATz, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEiNcs (1972).
104. Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil
Commitment, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 88 (1968).
105. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Chambers,
Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides
and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972); Wexler,
Scoville, et al., The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and
Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 140-46 (1971).
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by procedural safeguards given to deviants and by substantive
standards defining the appropriate scope of therapeutic involve-
ment. It is, then, to those problems that we will now turn.
B. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Although in theory procedural safeguards in a system of
therapeutic justice might arguably be described as unnecessary
impediments, it is very difficult in practice to justify any sub-
stantial relaxation of traditional procedural protections. First of
all, as the Supreme Court recognized in Gault, the best of bene-
volent intentions does not always yield an acceptable thera-
peutic atmosphere, and "unbridled discretion, however benevo-
lently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle
and procedure."1 0 6 If commitment may lead to unwanted dep-
rivation of liberty and to aversive and even ineffective therapy,
it is difficult to discard procedural protections. Moreover, even
if all concerned supposedly have "the best interests" of the de-
viant at heart, therapeutic proceedings cannot afford to dispense
altogether with an adversary framework.
The sciences of behavior-particularly but not exclusively
psychiatry-are sufficiently inexact to allow for considerable
room for scrutinizing the evaluations of the testifying experts
through skillful cross-examination by counsel and by the presen-
tation of independent experts.107 It is well known, for example,
that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness are notoriously
inaccurate and are decidedly in the direction of overpredicting
future dangerous conduct.10 8 Moreover, a lawyer-psychologist
who has reviewed the pertinent literature has demonstrated that
intradisciplinary disputes in psychiatry and clinical psychology
are so prevalent, and basic doctrines are so open to question, that
few expert assumptions can safely go unchallenged. 0 9 Indeed,
even the "harder"--and presumably more credible-sciences such
as neurology are in need of serious ventilation in the commitment
context. Thus, some physicians, drawing upon neurological
knowledge to the effect that violent behavior attributable to
brain pathology can often be detected by electroencephalogram
(EEG) readings, have recommended that violent offenders with
106. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
107. J. ZisxI&, COPING WITH PsYcIATRIc ANM PSYCHOLOGICAL TEMS-
MONY (1970); see also Cohen, supra note 62.
108. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment:
A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, 2 PsYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb., 1969, at 43.
109. See J. ZmsxN, supra note 107.
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demonstrated abnormal electrical brain activity be removed
from society until their EEG's become normal. 110 Only an ag-
gressive adversary proceeding, however, would enable a deviant
to demonstrate some of the flaws of EEG interpretation: that,
for example, a sizable proportion of the normal population has
abnormal EEG's, and that an abnormal EEG, instead of being
a cause of violence, may be the result of a violent episode involv-
ing a head injury."'
Though counsel and independent experts are obviously re-
quired in order to effectively scrutinize medical and behavioral
science testimony, counsel is needed to perform more mundane-
but equally important-functions. Counsel, for example, is in-
dispensable in investigating the factual basis for the exercise
of therapeutic power, and in ascertaining whether any alterna-
tives less restrictive than commitment are suitable in the partic-
ular case, and whether those alternatives have been properly ex-
plored by the relevant officials." 12
Although, as we have seen, many therapeutic commitment
proceedings today conform to a "medical" model and often do
not provide for a court hearing with counsel, independent ex-
perts, and the like, the current trend is decidedly in favor of
providing basic protections, though not of as elaborate a na-
ture as those provided in criminal proceedings. Very recently,
for example, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin rendered in Lessard v. Schmidt'13 a far-
reaching decision dealing with the commitment of the mentally
ill, but probably pertinent to the entire ambit of therapeutic jus-
tice. There the court ruled that a proposed patient was entitled,
among other things, to notice of the judicial proceedings, to a
privilege against self-incrimination vis-A-vis the examining psy-
chiatrists, to a relatively prompt judicial hearing, to retained or
appointed counsel who is to function as an advocate, and to a
commitment determination meeting a beyond-reasonable-doubt
test. Beyond those provided boldly in Lessard, a handful of
additional safeguards are necessary to prevent possible abuse:
the right to an independent medical or behavioral science expert,
the right to be provided with a transcript of the proceedings, the
right to an expedited appellate review of a commitment determi-
110. Wexler, Book Review, 85 HIv. L. REv. 1489 (1972).
111. See V. MARK & F. ERVI, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAn (1970);
Wexler, Book Review, 85 HAu v. L. REV. 1489 (1972).
112. See Cohen, supra note 62.
113. No. 71-C-602 (E.D. Wis., filed Oct. 18, 1972).
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nation, and the right, following commitment, to a periodic judi-
cial review (with counsel, independent experts, and with the
state carrying the burden of proof) of the need for continued
commitment or treatment.
Lessard is not simply an isolated example, but is instead re-
flective of an emerging concern for protection even in a thera-
peutic environment. Legislative proposals are following a strik-
ingly similar course. The proposed Uniform Drug Dependence
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act,114 for example, provides for
many of the described safeguards. But the most encouraging de-
velopment of all, perhaps, is that the question of the necessity for
procedural protections is no longer one that is almost automati-
cally answered along polarized lines, with the legal profession
urging protection and the medical and allied professions urging
the abandonment of legal apparatus. In that connection, the per-
tinent portion of the American Psychiatric Association's recently
adopted "Position Statement on Involuntary Hospitalization of
the Mentally Ill" is worthy of quotation:
Any form of involuntary hospitalization should provide full
rights of due process; all of these rights should be guaranteed
the patient regardless of his ability to pay for the services they
may entail. It is suggested that these rights encompass the fol-
lowing provisions:
1. That a psychiatric examination and evaluation be made
by the hospitalizing physician;
2. That the patient and other parties to the procedure have
legal counsel available to them;
3. That the court promptly determine the need for hospital-
ization, and in making such determination have available to it
the results of an examination of the patient by one or more psy-
chiatrists;
4. That, in addition, examination by one or more inde-
pendent psychiatrists other than those appointed by the court
be allowed the patient if he requests it;
5. That if, and after, the patient is hospitalized, frequent
and periodic reports of his condition, treatment, and progress be
made to the committing court or to its agency, to the patient's
attorney, and to all of the examining physicians, and further, that
the responsibility for follow-up action on these reports be that
of an agency attached to the committing court;
6. That the patient have the right to seek a judicial deter-
mination of the need for his continued hospitalization at
reasonable intervals of time, and not less than every six months,
that in such proceedings the patient be entitled to legal coun-
sel and to examination by one or more independent psychiatrists,
114. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORi STATE
LAws, UNIFORM DRUG DEPENDENCE AND REHABILITATION AcT, Tent. Draft
1972.
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and that the burden of proof of the need for continued hospital-
ization rest with the responsible treatment authority or agency;
and
7. That no patient be denied treatment because of adminis-
trative, judicial, or institutional delay." 5
C. SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
1. General
Recently, in Jackson v. Indiana,'" the Supreme Court vir-
tually invited reconsideration of the substantive bases for the
assertion of therapeutic control:
The States have traditionally exercised broad power to commit
persons found to be mentally ill. The substantive limitations on
the exercise of this power and the procedures for invoking it
vary drastically among the States. The particular fashion in
which the power is exercised-for instance, through various
forms of civil commitment, defective delinquency laws, sexual
psychopath laws, commitment of persons acquitted by reason of
insanity-reflects different combinations of distinct bases for
commitment sought to be vindicated. The bases that have been
articulated include dangerousness to self, dangerousness to
others, and the need for care or treatment or training. Consid-
ering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable
that the substantive constitutional limitations on this power
have not been more frequently litigated." 7
The articulated bases of control-danger to others, danger to
self, and need for care and treatment-are, as we have already
seen, rather imprecise concepts.1 18  Furthermore, the concepts,
if loosely drawn, actually overlap to a considerable extent.
Thus, need for care and treatment can easily be viewed as a
subset of a broadly read danger to self test, for the refusal to
undergo needed treatment is surely, in a broad sense, damaging
to one's self. Also, there is no sharp dividing line between the
danger to self test and the danger to others test. Arguably, for
example, it is damaging to oneself to engage in conduct which
is dangerous to others and which, accordingly, may result in a
severe disruption of the deviant's own life, perhaps leading to a
prolonged period of punitive or therapeutic confinement. And
finally, because of the intricacies of social life, very little if any
self-harming conduct affects only the actor and not other mem-
115. American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on In-
voluntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 128 AM. J. PsYCIATRY
1480 (1972).
116. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
117. Id. at 736-37.
118. Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 104, at 18 et seq.
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bers of society, and thus, as Kaplan has noted, most conduct
which is dangerous to oneself poses at least "secondary" harm
to others.119 A motorcyclist who refuses to wear a helmet and
is injured may become an expensive public ward, and, moreover,
if he has a family, it too may become state-supported. The same
may be said for alcoholism and drug dependence:
As an emotional matter, moreover, nonsupport justifications
for laws which attempt to prevent self-harming conduct often
command considerably more power than do public ward justifi-
cations. Thus, despite the enormous public ward justifications
for halting alcohol abuse, one of the most powerful Prohibi-
tionist posters contained a drawing of a saloon with the father
drinking at the bar while his clean, but poorly dressed, little
daughter stood in the doorway saying, "Father, Father, please
come home. Mother needs you."'U2
Given the uncertainty of these terms and of their scope, it
is probably preferable, for purposes of legal analysis, to look to
traditional legal concepts for asserting state control over indi-
viduals, and to determine from them the acceptable boundaries
for the exercise of therapeutic jurisdiction, both for conduct that
is dangerous to others and for self-harming conduct. The tra-
ditional doctrines are, of course, the police power of the State-a
protection of society rationale--and the State's role as parens pa-
triae-a paternalistic rationale.
2. Police Power
Ordinarily, the state's police power is exercised pursuant to
the criminal law process, where punishment and restraint are
imposed upon a deviant found, after-the-fact, to have committed
a societal harm. But in the therapeutic arena, commitment of
deviants for the protection of society is often done before-the-fact,
in anticipation of future harm. Like it or not, such a course takes
us into the unfamiliar and uncomfortable area of preventive de-
tention.
Although preventive detention remains unfamiliar to us
conceptually, it has actually long been practiced in American
law, particularly with respect to the commitment of the mentally
ill.121 Moreover, some forms of restraint in order to prevent
harm to others, such as imposing quarantines on persons suf-
119. See Kaplan, The Role of the Law in Drug Control, 1971 DuKE
L.J. 1065.
120. Id. at 1066.
121. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About
Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDuc. 24 (1970).
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fering from serious contagious diseases, strike us as wholly le-
gitimate. 1 22
While the vast topic of preventive detention is obviously
beyond the scope of the present paper, it is nonetheless prob-
ably safe to assert that preventive restraint strikes us as legiti-
mate only when we can feel confident beyond a reasonable doubt
that, if unrestrained, the subject would cause harm to others.
Such would hold true for an individual suffering from a serious
contagious disease as well as for an angry psychotic who believes
God has instructed him to kill all sinners.123 Furthermore, as
drastic a remedy as substantial deprivation of liberty seems
proper only to prevent serious harms-and not, for example, the
"secondary" public ward and nonsupport type harms discussed
by Kaplan.:2 4  Presumably, coercive restraint and treatment to
offset rather minor harms might be permissible only if a brief
deprivation of liberty or a rather inoffensive treatment might, as
would a quarantine, assuredly prevent the resulting harms.12
It has been said that "[i]f the chronic common cold could be
permanently cured by a week in a solarium, the social benefit
would probably be worth the cost in liberty and sunburn."'' 2 0 So
might the balance be struck with deviance.
The problem is, however, that predictions of dangerousness
are hazardous indeed, 27 and proving contingent harm beyond a
reasonable doubt is a most difficult task. In the mental health
law area, the prediction problem has been in part overcome by
requirements of some recent statutes and cases that dangerous-
ness be proven by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do sub-
stantial harm.1 28  That approach, though it is obviously in
need of additional refinement, seems to be emerging as a gen-
erally acceptable model of preventive restraint.
The applicability of that model to drug dependence poses some
interesting questions. It seems, for instance, that addicts are not
per se dangerous. On the contrary, because of the sense of well
being that accompanies drug taking, addicts rarely commit vio-
122. Note, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 76 YALE L.J. 1160,
1179 (1967).
123. Id. at 1182-83.
124. See Kaplan, supra note 119.
125. See Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 104.
126. Note, supra note 122, at 1188-89.
127. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About
Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24 (1970).
128. Lessard v. Schmidt, No. 71-C-602 (E.D. Wis., filed Oct. 18, 1972);
Wexler, Scoville, et al., supra note 105, at 112.
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lent crimes,129 although violence may occur when their habit
is "down on" them.130 They commit virtually no sexual crimes,13 1
and commit far fewer aggravated assaults than does the general
population, and although their robbery rates somewhat ex-
ceed those of general population, many technically designated
robberies are simply purse snatchings.132 Moreover, reports to
the effect that addicts are responsible for half of New York City's
crimes have been described as a canard, for such statistics ap-
parently include violations of narcotic prohibition laws, which
addicts by definition violate daily.133  On the other hand, it
does seem clear that addicts, though not all of them, are likely
to commit property offenses, such as petty theft, in order to fi-
nance their habits. 34
But committing addicts in order to avert property crimes
poses a number of serious issues. In addition to the offensiveness
of committing people partially because they are poor (we would
not be willing to commit non-addict poor people simply on a
showing that they were likely to steal), we are faced with the
argument that
the virtual certainty that addicts will break the law is in a di-
rect sense the state's own fault. An addict's need for narcotics
is by definition beyond his control. By denying him legal access
to narcotics, the state makes him ipso facto an habitual criminal.
By obliging him to obtain his drugs at exorbitant black mar-
ket prices, the same legislative policy also drives poor addicts in-
exorably to theft. It flouts fundamental fairness for the state
to force a man to commit crimes and at the same time to punish
or confine him on grounds of his resultant criminality. 3 5
Fundamental fairness or not, current law and practice permits
the state both to punish and to commit because of the result-
ant criminality. Yet, the criminality could be virtually elimi-
nated if the law were to sanction drug maintenance systems, for
we know that addiction does not per se lead to crime, as evi-
denced by the large number of persons at the turn of the century
who became medically addicted to morphine and to heroin but
who, with the drugs legally available, did not engage in crimi-
129. Aronowitz, Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 67 COLUm.
L. REv. 405 (1967); Note, supra note 122, at 1183.
130. Ami cAx BAR AssOciATON, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN
CR=nv 48-49 (1972) (report of Special Committee on Crime Prevention
and Control).
131. Note, supra note 122, at 1183.
132. Aronowitz, supra note 129, at 414.
133. Note, supra note 122, at 1177 n.55.
134. Id. at 1183.
135. Id. at 1185.
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nal activity.13 6 Proposals for maintenance systems, particularly
for heroin maintenance patterned after the British model, have
been sharply criticized not only on moral grounds but on grounds
that it will spread addiction, demoralize and de-politicize the
ghettos, and leave addicts at the mercy of the government.18 7
Seemingly, a carefully constructed maintenance approach could
grapple successfully with those issues. But, for preventive de-
tention purposes, whether or not heroin maintenance is adopted,
there is a strong argument that, at the least, "the state should
certainly be estopped from confining addicts for fear of the crimes
it obliges them to commit."1 38
Surely, the state should be so estopped so long as the crimi-
nal law remains available to punish addiction-related theft of-
fenses. It seems unlikely that the doctrine of Robinson v. Cali-
fornia 139 or the doctrine of "pharmacological duress" will in
the foreseeable future be extended to excuse addiction-produced
property offenses. Hence, given that premise, the danger to
property seems an insufficient reason for preventive detention
(unless, of course, we wish to break entirely new ground and pre-
ventively detain addicts to prevent property offenses on the
rationale that addicts will presumably not be criminally ap-
prehended for numerous property offenses that they commit).
Only if we had a sure-fire cure for addiction by brief confine-
ment or by some miracle drug might we, by analogy to a quar-
antine, preventively detain to avoid rather minor offenses such as
property crimes.
Of course, the after-the-fact criminal approach is obviously
not an ideal solution any more than is preventive detention. But
if we believe in any case that preventive detention should not be
invoked short of a showing that the deviant recently demon-
strated a propensity to do substantial harm by means of a
threat, attempt, or an overt act, 40 that will mean, at least in the
context of narcotics addiction, that the addict will probably have
committed a crime, such as theft or attempted theft, cognizable
by the criminal law. Instead of preventive detention, how-
ever, we could devise an acceptable alternative: the criminal law
process could be used to detect those addicts who commit or at-
tempt property offenses and, by enabling them to elect treatment
136. AmmicAN BAR AssociAoN, supra note 130, at 26-27.
137. See Markham, supra note 96.
138. Note, supra note 122, at 1187.
139. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
140. Lessard v. Schmidt, No. 71-C-602 (E.D. Wis., filed Oct. 18, 1972).
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in lieu of punishment, could be used to encourage them to seek
treatment for their addiction. 141
The treatment alternative should be legally structured to
provide sufficient safeguards and to encourage its election. For
example, criminal punishment could be held in abeyance for
those addict-defendants who elect treatment. The treatment
should be for a period not exceeding the typical criminal
penalty for the offense, and, if an additional "carrot" for the
treatment avenue is thought necessary, the therapeutic period
could entail a length of time less than the criminal period. Proper
completion of treatment should result in vitiating the criminal
proceedings, but an uncooperative attitude toward therapy could
result in a transfer to the criminal system, with, however,
credit toward the criminal sentence for all time spent in the
therapeutic process. Interestingly and perhaps significantly for
this peno-therapeutic paradigm, a recent study of the federal
Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, which has provision both for
pure civil commitment and for the election of treatment while
criminal charges remain pending, found the success rate under
the latter provision to exceed the success rate under the former,
which, according to the authors, "suggests that external legal
pressure to comply with the program is a factor in success.' 142
3. Parens Patriae
a. General
Although commitments pursuant to the police power may
often involve therapeutic elements, the real basis for intervention
under the police power is, of course, the protection of society.
Accordingly, the true essence of the therapeutic state is its pa-
ternalistic or parens patriae jurisdiction, whereby state inter-
vention is assumedly exercised to serve the best interests of the
deviant subject.
Ordinarily, however, we have rather strong philosophical and
legal objections to the exercise of paternalistic power. The
guiding premise has been that provided by John Stuart
141. Robertson, Pre-trial Diversion of Drug Offenders: A Statutory
Approach, 52 B.U.L. REv. 335 (1972). Note, Addict Diversion: An Al-
ternative Approach for the Criminal Justice System, 60 GEo. L.J. 667
(1972). See also NATIONAL CONr ENCE OF CoMMISSION~mS ON UNuowma
STATE LAws, UNIFORM DRUG DEPENDENCE ANm REHABILITATION Acr, Tent.
Draft, 1972.
142. Bowden & Langenauer, Success and Failure in the NARA Ad-
diction Program, 128 AmL J. PsYcHIATRY 853, 855 (1972).
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Mill,1 43 that society ought to interfere with an individual against
his will only to protect others, not to protect the individual him-
self. And a strong case can be made that society should indeed
refrain from interfering even when there is a possible harm to
others, so long as that harm is simply "incidental" or "second-
ary," such as public ward or non-support harm.14" There are
presumably several reasons underlying the general philosophi-
cal resistance to paternalistic interferences: the state may not
know what is in fact "best" for the individual, it may not have
the ability to improve his lot even if it properly understands his
best interest, and, perhaps most important, it offends one's dig-
nity to have the state meddling in his personal affairs. 1 4
By and large, the anti-paternalistic premise has been ad-
hered to in law and practice. Society does not typically inter-
vene to prevent self-harming conduct. The law, of course, does
not require that we diet, refrain from smoking, or seek treatment
for serious coronary problems. Nor does society intervene to pre-
vent even rather bizarre risk-taking. Recent news stories have
included, for example, reports that one couple, claiming accusa-
tions against DDT were false, decided to prove their case by in-
gesting some daily, and that an ambitious oarsman had just com-
pleted a solo rowing trip of 4400 miles.
The real question, it seems, is not simply whether pater-
nalistic intervention is in the individual's best interests but
"whether the state has the right to decide that question for
him.' 46 Typically, the state is given that right when it can
be demonstrated that the individual is mentally incompetent to
know-or to make rational decisions regarding-his own best
interest.
In the area of the commitment of the mentally ill, the older
view was that mentally ill persons were per se incompetent,
enabling society to commit and treat them, even over objection,
in order to further their best interests. Recently, however, it
has been clearly demonstrated that mental illness does not auto-
matically produce incompetence--"that many persons who are
mentally ill are entirely competent to make rational and im-
portant decisions concerning their affairs, including the decision
143. Mill, On Liberty, in J.S. MILL & T. CARLYLE, HARVARD CLASSICS
203 (1909).
144. See Kaplan, supra note 119.
145. Stone, Psychiatry and the Law, PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 18, 28
(Oct. 1971).
146. Note, supra note 122, at 1168.
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to accept or reject hospital treatment. '147 Accordingly, pater-
nalistic intervention with respect to a mentally ill person should
now require as a prerequisite a specific showing that the person
is incompetent to make responsible decisions regarding his treat-
ment.
The difficulty even with the modern test is that too often
the mere refusal of a patient to accept hospitalization or treat-
ment is improperly taken to establish his mental incompetence.
Of course, some refusals to accept treatment may be the result of
incompetence, but a refusal, even if wrong, should not itself es-
tablish incompetence, for the true test ought to be not whether
the patient's particular decision is wise, but whether he is men-
tally capable of competent decision making.148
Moreover, a patient's "wrong" decision to refuse treatment
may, on close analysis, prove to be correct. Ennis makes the
point well:
To begin with, the choice of liberty rather than treatment might
not be "wrong". Some types of mental illness are not treatable
at all And even for those types that are treatable, the prob-
ability that a given patient will permanently be cured, or even
improved, because of the treatment, is discouragingly low. Of
course, a good number of patients committed to mental hospi-
tals are released "as improved" within a matter of months, but
most of them return. Also, there is very little hard evidence
that even temporary improvement is the result of the treat-
ment and is not, instead, a spontaneous remission.
In determining whether it is necessarily "wrong" for a mentally
ill person to choose liberty rather than hospitalization, it should
also be noted that even short-term hospitalization can, of it-
self, reinforce and exacerbate some types of mental illness, and
that long-term hospitalization is particularly anti-therapeutic.
In that event, the choice is not between liberty and health, but
between functioning at an impaired level or getting worse.
More precisely, the choice is the risk of getting worse on the out-
side, compared with the risk of getting worse in the hospital.
We must also remember that treatment in a mental hospital is
often degrading and occasionally brutal, and ... even voluntary
hospitalization creates a terrible and lasting stigma. Finally,
most state hospitals provide only custodial welfare, not treat-
ment.14 9
From the above, we ought to be able to derive some prin-
ciples for the proper exercise of the parens patriae power. First,
we must carefully examine the patient to determine whether
147. Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CaRM L. BuLL. 101,
104 (1971).
148. Id.; Note, supra note 122, at 1173 & n.44.
149. Ennis, supra note 147, at 105-06.
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he is in fact incompetent or whether he is simply making a
"wrong" choice regarding treatment. Second, even if he is in-
competent, we must look to see whether, in actuality, forced
commitment or treatment is in the patient's best interest. Thus,
incompetence may be a necessary condition for the assertion
of parens patriae jurisdiction, but it alone is not a sufficient
condition. In addition to a finding of incompetence, in other
words, we must also make a social judgment whether we ought
to override the patient's stated desires. To answer the second
prong of the test affirmatively, we ought to demand clear proof
that, according to some objective consensus, the patient's
"best interests" require that he submit to the proposed course of
hospitalization or therapy. In other words, prior to taking the
drastic course of overriding even an irrational will, we should
be clearly persuaded that a rational person in the patient's posi-
tion would opt for the proposed therapeutic course. That ques-
tion ought to be answered by carefully weighing a multitude of
factors, including the patient's prognosis and the likely length
of confinement, the treatment available, his preference for lib-
erty, the interruption of his vocational and family life, his
attitude toward mental hospitals, conditions of everyday life at
the hospital, the stigma of hospitalization, and related matters.
b. Narcotics Addiction
The propriety of exercising paternalistic power in the drug
addiction area can be discussed according to analytically iden-
tical lines, although the relevant empirical facts may of course
differ. The question of the incompetence of drug addicts, for ex-
ample, seems even more difficult and more subtle than is
the question of the incompetence of mental patients. Many
mental patients are so psychotic and out of touch with reality
that they may not know their own identity or may totally lack
orientation regarding time and place. They may easily meet
the necessary test of incompetence and irrationality. Drug ad-
dicts, on the other hand, are seldom classified as psychotic, and
they ordinarily retain contact with reality. If addicts are to be
considered incompetent, then, it must be because their overpow-
ering compulsion to consume drugs prevents them from reach-
ing a rational decision regarding treatment.
There seems to be a great deal of dispute regarding the com-
petency of narcotic addicts to rationally choose to forego drugs
and to seek treatment. Dr. Nils Bejerot, for example, has char-
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acterized drug addition, as opposed to mere drug abuse, as the
equivalent of a "basic drive," and one where "the depend-
ence dominates the individual and his way of life."'5 0  Dis-
cussing the overpowering qualities of addiction, Bejerot notes
that in the insect world, a certain type of ant becomes spon-
taneously addicted to a secretion produced by a certain beetle,
and that the ants will, in times of danger, protect the beetles be-
fore they rescue their own eggs-a situation not unlike that in
old China, where opium smokers sometimes sold their wives and
children to obtain needed opium. In short, Bejerot concludes
that narcotics addiction is a pathological condition so enjoyed
by the addict that he may be incapable of structuring his life in
any way other than around the continued satisfaction of his
habit. If that is so, we might well have a factually and legally
acceptable approximation of incompetence. But it is also true,
of course, that some addicts do decide to enter treatment, and that
cuts against a blanket notion equating addiction with incompe-
tence. One commentator has argued rather persuasively that ad-
diction should not in itself establish incompetency:
But if addicts have lost their powers of self-control, so have
all chain smokers and compulsive gamblers. They have all lost
control over a partial and clearly limited area of conduct, but
not over conduct or decision-making capacity generally. They
are unable to decide not to smoke or gamble, but they are as
competent to decide to attempt a cure of their habit as to de-
cide whether to undergo an operation or to come in out of the
rain. Addiction, as a shorthand expression for compulsive psy-
chological dependence, makes no man a ward of the state un-
less his weakness has some additional effects on his mental
processes generally.15 1
From the existing facts, the most that can be said, perhaps,
is that the question of the competency of addicts is debatable,
but even if they are deemed incompetent it is difficult to justify
their commitment, at least along traditional lines where absti-
nence is the goal and where the means include institutionaliza-
tion, detoxification, counseling, and supervised aftercare. Com-
mitment is not easily justified because the second prong of the
requirement for the exercise of paternalistic power-that coerced
treatment is in fact clearly in the patient's best interest-is
exceedingly difficult to meet in the area of addiction. First of
all
an addict's refusal to be treated is not necessarily irrational.
For one thing, even if the cure were always a lesser evil than the
150. Bejerot, A Theory of Addiction as an Artificially Induced
Drive, 128 Aav. J. PSYCHIATRY 842, 843 (1972).
151. Note, supra note 122, at 1174.
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disease, the prospect of cure is uncertain and distant, and the
prospects of long confinement and indefinite supervision are cor-
respondingly excellent. Moreover, whatever his failings, the ad-
dict has a special competence with regard to assessing the
value of treatment for him. He may not know what commit-
ment would be like, but he better than anyone knows the evils
of addiction, and he knows what his life was like before ad-
diction. The point is not that addiction is bliss, but rather that
for many addicts neither is life without drugs. Even an in-
formed, intelligent, and otherwise sane addict might conceivably
prefer not to endure institutional confinement for the privilege
of facing the world without a crutch.15 2
Addicts may differ, of course, with respect to their need for
crutches in dealing with life, but there is widespread uniformity
among evaluators and commentators that the traditional
method for dealing with addiction-the abstinence model involv-
ing forced detoxification, hospitalization and aftercare-is an ex-
pensive failure. The civil commitment schemes for controlling
addiction have simply not worked.153  The strong consensus is
in conformity with the view expressed by Aronowitz that
there is no evidence that the method of treatment which the ad-
dict would be compelled to undergo if he were committed offers
any reasonable hope of curing his addiction. At present, pro-
ponents of involuntary commitment can offer virtually no em-
pirical data to support the claim that institutionalization in a
drug-free environment followed by intensive aftercare supervi-
sion offers even a fair chance of cure for the average narcotic
addict.154
It is true, of course, that some of the newer methods of ad-
diction control-such as those, like methadone maintenance,
which abjure the abstinence model-are quite successful in ac-
complishing their goals. 155 But coercive treatment of an addict
is no less objectionable simply because the therapeutic experts
might, in their discretion, decide to place the committed addict
on a methadone maintenance program: so long as the addict may
be physically committed and subjected to the traditional ab-
stinence approaches, the validity of the paternalistic inter-
vention will remain questionable, even though the addict may
find himself fortunate enough to be tried on methadone main-
152. Id. at 1176.
153. A.MERcAN BAR ASsocIATIoN, supra note 130, at 41; COMM'N OF
INQUIRY INTO THE NON-MEDICAL USE or DRUGS, TREATmENT 10-17 (1972);
Aronowitz, supra note 129; Kramer, The State Versus the Addict:
Uncivil Commitment, 50 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1970).
154. Aronowitz, supra note 129, at 417.
155. AlvmmxcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 130, at 53-54; COMM'N
OF INQUIRY INTO THE NON-MEDICAL USE OF DRUGS, supra note 153, at
23-31.
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tenance. That is so, of course, because the paternalistic inter-
ference must be judged by its maximal control over an addict.
But the legal and philosophical situation might be quite
different, therefore, if a court exercising paternalistic jurisdic-
tion were permitted to order therapy short of hospitalization. 15 0
Such a court, in a narcotics context, might be authorized, for ex-
ample, to order an addict to participate in a methadone main-
tenance program. To justify that exercise of paternalistic
jurisdiction, the court in each case would have to decide whether,
from all the facts about the addict and about methadone pro-
grams, it is objectively in the addict's best interests to subject
him to such a treatment procedure. Even if so, however, the
order could legitimately be issued only if the empirical ques-
tion regarding the competency of addicts were resolved in the
negative.
A nutshell summary of the proper exercise of parens patriae
jurisdiction over narcotic addicts, then, suggests that they should
not be subjected to traditional commitment programs, and that
they might be subjected to rather effective programs only if we
were to conclude that they are incompetent to decide rationally
whether they are better off in or out of treatment. It should be
noted, however, that this approach permits us to reach addicts
under the parens patriae power only after they have already
become addicts, and hence when they are most difficult to treat
successfully. Prior to their becoming actual addicts, even re-
peated abusers would be difficult to reach under the traditional
paternalistic model because they have not yet lost control over
their drug taking and hence seem perfectly competent to de-
cide their own fate. The traditional position has been expressed
as follows:
Addiction itself, then, is not grounds for benevolent com-
mitment. Nor, a fortiori, is an imminent danger of addiction
resulting from the repeated use of narcotics. Repeated use
without addiction is not itself a mental disability of any sort,
nor is there here even that limited loss of self-control which
some courts have in other contexts mistakenly thought to be suf-
ficient for commitment 157
c. Narcotics Abuse
It is arguable, however, along two related but distinct lines
of thought, both of which are admittedly somewhat unconven-
156. Wexler, Scoville, et al., supra note 105, at 243.
157. Not% supra note 122, at 1176-77.
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tional, that the parens patriae power could legitimately be ex-
tended to reach the earlier stage of narcotics abuse and that pa-
ternalistic jurisdiction could more appropriately be exercised
then, rather than after addition has taken hold. But justified
paternalistic intervention at that early stage must be viewed as
speculative, for it requires the acceptance of a somewhat novel
conceptual framework, the proper resolution of several empir-
ical questions, and perhaps a level of scientific knowledge which
we have not yet reached.
The first theory is based on an extension of the concept of
consent. Obviously, paternalistic measures taken on behalf of
a person with his consent are ordinarily unobjectionable.
Furthermore, as the contemporary philosopher Gerald Dwor-
kin has demonstrated in his recent essay "Paternalism,"' 5 8 there
are instances where paternalistic interferences can be justified
by the doctrine of consent even though, at the precise time of
the paternalistic intervention, the affected individual might object
to the action: "Under certain conditions it is rational for an in-
dividual to agree that others should force him to act in ways
which, at the time of action, the individual may not see as de-
sirable. If, for example, a man knows that he is subject to break-
ing his resolves when temptation is present, he may ask a
friend to refuse to entertain his requests at some later stage."''5
True, he may later assert that he has changed his mind, but "since
it is just such changes that he wished to guard against we are
entitled to ignore them."' 60
That type of consensual theory is employed today to justify
various therapeutic measures. Applied behavioral psycholo-
gists have, for example, devised schemes of "behavioral con-
tracting" or "contingency contracting," where the subject may
agree that certain benefits should be given him contingent upon
certain appropriate behavior. 16' For instance, Mann' 02 used a
contingency contract procedure to encourage weight loss in over-
weight adults. Persons desiring to lose weight could voluntarily
158. Dworkin, Paternalism, in R. WASSERSTROM, MORAIITY AND THE
LAw 107 (1971).
159. Id. at 119.
160. Id. at 120 (emphasis in original).
161. Mann, The Behavior-Therapeutic Use of Contingency Contract-
ing to Control an Adult Behavior Problem: Weight Control, 5 J. APPLIED
BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 99 (1972); Thorne, Tharpe & Wetzel, Behavior Modifi-
cation Techniques: New Tools for Probation Officers, 31 FED. PRoD. 21
(June 1967).
162. See Mann, supra note 161.
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surrender various meaningful items to the therapist and enter into
a contract whereby various items would be returned or forfeited
(donated to charities) contingent upon weight loss, weight gain,
etc. The contract was actually a "behavior trap" since, after
it was voluntarily entered into, it would have a lasting influ-
ence on behavior, and a later change of heart on the part of the
client would be to no avail. A similar behavior trap, now
given legal blessing, is operative in the institutional treatment of
narcotics addiction. An addict who voluntarily seeks treat-
ment for his addiction in a federal facility and who pursues the
proper legal channels can be accepted for treatment on condition
that he remain for a specified period of time. Although early
cases went the other way,1 63 recent cases hold that the addict is
bound by his agreement and cannot legally leave the hospital
at will. His voluntary application is technically converted into
a commitment, and in the words of Ortega v. Rasor,104 "The
Court will not permit the petitioner to terminate his treatment
simply because the road to recovery is bumpy."'1 5
But the consent concept can be stretched even further than
in the above examples. Dworkin again gives an example:
[I]t is very difficult for a child to defer gratification for any
considerable period of time... [G]iven the very real and
permanent dangers that may befall the child it becomes not
only permissible but even a duty of the parent to restrict the
child's freedom in various ways. There is however an impor-
tant moral limitation on the exercise of such parental power
which is provided by the notion of the child eventually coming
to see the correctness of his parent's interventions. Parental pa-
ternalism may be thought of as a wager by the parent on the
child's subsequent recognition of the wisdom of the restrictions.
There is an emphasis on what could be called future-oriented
consent-on what the child will come to welcome, rather than on
what he does welcome.166
"Future-oriented" consent, while used in the above example
to justify interference with a legally incompetent subject, need
not necessarily be restricted to instances of incompetency. Per-
sons who attempt suicide are by no means always mentally in-
competent at the time of the attempt. Of the competent ones,
some may have rationally wanted to die, while others, though
perhaps sincere in their desire to die, may have been "wrong." If
all persons who attempted suicide were somehow saved by soci-
ety's suicide prevention efforts, the saved persons would pre-
163. Ex parte Lloyd, 13 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Ky. 1936).
164. 291 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
165. Id. at 752.
166. Dworkin, supra note 158, at 119.
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sumably have differing reactions concerning society's paternalis-
tic efforts. The incompetent ones, if and when they regained
competency, might well appreciate society's efforts, as might
those who were competent but "wrong" about their decision to
die. Only those who were competent and arguably rational
about their attempted suicide-for instance, terminally ill per-
sons, etc.-might strongly object to society's "benevolent" ac-
tion in saving them.
If we wanted to be philosophically pure in our paternalistic
suicide prevention efforts-and if we were practically equipped
to make the necessary subtle distinctions-we might well let the
competent but "correct" persons die, 1' 7 but might save the others
in the expectation of receiving their future consent. Surely, if
future consent were to be actually given, we would doubtless
feel justified in our earlier paternalistic invasions. And be-
cause we cannot in practice determine at the critical time of
rescue which persons would give future consent to the rescue
efforts and which would not, we feel justified in saving them
all, presumably on the assumption-and this is an empirical
matter-that not an insubstantial number would be belatedly
appreciative.
The future consent analysis regarding suicide prevention is
suggestive of an approach for paternalistically acceptable in-
tervention in the area of narcotics abuse. Interestingly, the
same approach generally cuts against paternalistic intervention
in the area of narcotics addiction.
It is probably true that most addicts would be unwilling
to submit to conventional abstinence treatment. Indeed, Dr.
Alan Stone reports that
in New York a heroin addict may be arrested for stealing to sup-
port his habit, and if convicted for stealing will serve a brief
sentence as a criminal and be back out on the street. If, how-
ever, he is discovered to be an addict, he may not be punished;
instead, he may spend up to three years civilly confined for
treatment as a patient. Many addicts prefer brief criminal pun-
ishment to prolonged treatment, given these alternatives. In
fact, some observers report that the recent spate of suicides in
the Tombs (as the New York jail is appropriately called) is the
result of this cruel choice-attempting to conceal their addiction,
prisoners withdraw without medical assistance and some, it is
said, commit suicide in the throes of their withdrawal.16s
Not only would most addicts be initially opposed to the
traditional treatment, but it is likely that, were they forcibly
167. Szasz, The Ethics of Suicide, 31 ANnocH Rev. 7 (1971).
168. Stone, supra note 145, at 29.
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subjected to it, they would withhold their future consent. But
that by no means suggests that addicts do not wish to be cured.
Instead, it probably means simply that, as we have seen, tradi-
tional treatment techniques are therapeutically ineffective.
It may well be that most addicts, though unwilling to sub-
mit to traditional treatment, do wish they were not addicted,
and would submit to therapy if it were truly effective and not
terribly burdensome. That, however, is of course an empirical
question, for some addicts, desirous of a social crutch to offset
an oppressive environment, might opt for continued addiction
rather than cure. It would, indeed, be interesting--and presum-
ably important in terms of defining appropriate paternalistic
power-to ascertain the proportion of addicts who in fact
strongly wish they were not addicted.
Even assuming, however, that the number of addicts ser-
iously unhappy with their condition were overwhelmingly
high, the exercise of paternalistic jurisdiction over them would,
as we have seen, be highly questionable, for once they are ad-
dicted they will prove refractory to conventional treatment and
probably can, at best, find relief through some sort of mainten-
ance program. But a finding that addicts overwhelmingly de-
plore their condition should, under an application of a future-
consent rationale, enable us to intervene paternalistically and
preventively with narcotic abusers in order to offset the possi-
bility that the abusers will become addicted.
Therapeutic intervention could, for example, require pre-
addicts-"snorters," "joy-poppers" and the like-to submit to
counseling and to compulsory drug education focusing on the
facts of addiction. Furthermore, if some sort of narcotic antag-
onist could be developed which countered the euphoric and other
effects of narcotics without producing undesirable side effects,
a non-addict narcotics abuser could be required periodically to
take the antagonist, which should preclude his becoming an ad-
dict. And interestingly, since by definition non-addict abusers
have not yet lost control over their drug taking behavior, tradi-
tional criminal penalties inflicted at the narcotics abuse stage
might serve as general and specific deterrents to drug abuse.
Ironically, this may be an area where the criminal law may ac-
tually have a paternalistic function by deterring persons from
engaging in conduct which, if they engaged in it continually,
they would come to realize was against their best interests. A
judicious blending of therapeutic and perhaps penal meas-
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ures at the abuse stage might operate to reduce drastically the
problem of narcotics addiction.
Accordingly, the anticipated future-consent doctrine might
be read to permit paternalistic intervention with narcotic abus-
ers more so than with full-fledged addicts. Even though some
addicts may prefer addiction to non-addiction in order better to
cope with a stressful environment, if the factual evidence dem-
onstrates that addicts overwhelmingly regret having become ad-
dicted, policy considerations would probably permit across-the-
board efforts to prevent addiction, on the proper assumption
that, much like the suicide prevention example, we would be
unable to predict which abusers would ultimately come to ap-
preciate the paternalistic intervention and which would not.
There are, of course, several problems with the future-con-
sent model, some of which are not directly relevant to the pres-
ent discussion. For example, it is clear that not all interven-
tions can be legitimated by future consent. Psychosurgery, for
instance, may be ratified by the patient after the fact, but ther-
apy that drastic may well have so altered the personality that
the consent may actually be coming from an "identity" different
from the pre-surgical personality. But even with the drug abuse
situation, the model is not a perfect fit. Note, for example, that
in the suicide prevention illustration, the rescued persons, highly
cognizant of their new lease on life, would surely be able to ap-
preciate the paternalistic intervention and to give it their be-
lated consent. With the drug abusers, however, successful pre-
ventive efforts will operate to foreclose the subjects from ever
becoming addicts and experiencing the presumed agony of
addiction. Accordingly, while they may later come to appreci-
ate the paternalistic prevention, they also may not come to do so.
They might, for example, feel later just as they did at the time
of the intervention: that they would never have become
"hooked" and that the state simply acted to prevent them from
engaging in a pleasurable activity. This problem, and others
like it, must be handled by appropriate balancing efforts.
The appropriate balancing test seems rather easy to form-
ulate: the state should not act to prevent self-harming activities
on a future-consent basis unless the resentment it engenders from
the subject population is clearly outweighed either by the con-
sent eventually given by that population or by the agony en-
dured by a similar population that has not been prevented from
engaging in the self-injurious behavior. According to the sug-
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gested test, then, marijuana use, even if somewhat harmful to
repeated users, ought not to be paternalistically prohibited, for
the affront to dignity and the resentment caused by paternalis-
tic efforts-efforts which are not likely to eventuate in future
consent--cannot comfortably be outweighed by the known harm
done to some by prolonged use. On the other hand, if narcotic
addiction is shown to be absolutely tormenting to the great bulk
of addicts, the anguish of that population ought to be sufficient,
under a "would-be-future-consent" approach, to prevent abusers
from developing a full-blown habit, whether or not the abusers
ultimately come to appreciate fully the paternalistic efforts
taken on their behalf.
The second theory that may enable paternalistic power to be
exercised at the stage of narcotics abuse seems to come to the
same result as the future-consent theory, but by a somewhat
different line of reasoning. Even the anti-paternalistic posi-
tion of John Stuart Mill did not state absolutely that the will of
competent persons could never be paternalistically overridden.
Mill, for example, would impose the following paternalistic lim-
itation:
In this and most other civilized countries, for example, an en-
gagement by which a person should sell himself, or allow him-
self to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void; neither en-
forced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his
power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, is appar-
ent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. The reason
for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's
voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary
choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at the
least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best pro-
vided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it.
But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he
foregoes any future use of it, beyond that single act. He there-
fore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the jus-
tification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no longer
free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the
presumption in its favor, that would be afforded by his volun-
tarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require
that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be
allowed to alienate his freedom.169
Mill's slavery example may be illustrative of a paternalistic
principle. It seems that "the main consideration for not allowing
such a contract is the need to preserve the liberty of the per-
son to make future choices,"' -0 and that paternalism may be per-
169. Mill, supra note 143, at 311-12.
170. Dworkin, supra note 158, at 118.
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missible to prevent actions which, once taken, would lead irre-
versibly to a far-reaching constriction of future freedom. 17 1
Without attempting at this point to define the necessarily
vague contours of that principle, we could nonetheless easily
conclude that narcotics addiction is quite clearly equivalent to a
condition of bondage. We have already seen, for example, that
narcotics addiction has been characterized as a "basic drive," and
one where "[t] he individual loses the power to master his crav-
ing for the drug: the dependence dominates the individual and
his way of life."'1 72
Surely, then, at least within the context of our current le-
gal structure which prohibits heroin maintenance, narcotics ad-
diction could be treated as a form of physiological and psycho-
logical bondage. A more troubling empirical question is whether
addiction would also constitute slavery in the context of a sys-
tem authorizing heroin maintenance. To date, for example, no
study has measured the impact of heroin euphoria on the mental
functioning and social productivity of addicts. 1 7 3  On the one
hand, the heroin high is said to produce a sense of security
and self-confidence, traits which of course are highly consistent
with productivity. But the high has also been described as a
feeling of aloofness, creating a tendency to postpone decisions
and urgencies-traits which are clearly counter-productive.
1 74
Whatever the specific effect of the high, however, a heroin main-
tenance system might have to be structured so that the addict
would have to make several trips daily to obtain his needed sup-
ply of drugs,175 and, no matter how much better a situation that
may be than alternative solutions to the narcotics problem, the
complete dependence of the addict on obtaining his needed dose
may so restrict his freedom of action that his condition may still
resemble slavery.
If, of course, heroin maintenance proves in fact not to re-
semble slavery, and if maintenance systems are given the le-
gal go-ahead and come into widespread existence, there may be
less justification, under this "renounced freedom" philosophical
theory, to try paternalistically to forcibly cure or prevent ad-
diction. (Note, however, that even if heroin maintenance is not
deemed to be slavery, its effects or its inconvenience might be
171. Id. at 123.
172. Bejerot, supra note 150, at 843.
173. A i cA N BAR AsSOCTATION, supra note 130, at 58.
174. Id. at 45.
175. Note, supra note 122, at 1186 n.79.
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such that addicts might still regret having become addicted, thus
perhaps opening the door to a future-consent justification for
paternalistic preventive efforts.) But there are, as we have seen,
several serious objections to heroin maintenance systems,1 0 or
at least to heroin maintenance systems that are not rigidly re-
stricted in operation.177 Hence, if heroin maintenance does not
come into existence, or if it does come into existence but is
nevertheless found empirically to constitute a form of bondage,
the renounced-freedom paternalistic rationale might be available
for purposes of intervention, and therapeutic measures could ar-
guably be mandated if they held real promise for breaking the
bonds of addiction. Once again, however, paternalistic inter-
vention after the onset of addiction would be difficult to justify
in light of our therapeutic impotence at that stage. But manda-
tory counseling, required attendance at addiction education
programs, and the required consumption of "ideal" narcotic an-
tagonists, perhaps combined with the possibility of criminal
penalties, might be paternalistically ordered for non-addict nar-
cotics abusers in order to effectively prevent them from don-
ning the shackles of addiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The emergence of the therapeutic orientation in our legal
system dealing with deviant behavior is at once an exciting and
a troubling development. Many of the sociological and psycho-
logical implications of the gradual shift in orientation will not
be determined absent further research. It is already known,
however, that an unbridled therapeutic premise threatens many
other values cherished by society, and that legal constraints
must accordingly be carefully placed on the exercise of therapeu-
tic jurisdiction. In particular, certain important procedural
safeguards must not be sacrificed, and the substantive standards
for the exercise of the state's police power and parens patriae
jurisdiction must be clearly defined.
In the area of drug abuse and drug dependence, it seems that
the police power can probably best be exercised by encouraging
addicts apprehended for addiction-related offenses to seek treat-
ment as an alternative to criminal punishment. To accomplish
that, the treatment alternative should, in terms of length of
176. See Markham, What's All This Talk of Heroin Maintenance?,
Nsw YoRK Tnvms MAGAzna, July 2, 1972, at 6.
177. See Av cAs BAR AssociAT , supra note 130.
19721
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
confinement and other relevant factors, be more attractive-
or at least no less attractive-than the traditional criminal alter-
native. Although addiction has been resistant to cure, and al-
though methadone maintenance or carefully controlled heroin
maintenance seem to hold the most promise for offering the ad-
dict a productive future existence, the treatment offered as an
alternative to criminal punishment need not be restricted to a
maintenance approach. So long as the treatment is objectively
and subjectively less onerous than criminal punishment, ad-
dicts will be encouraged to elect it, and our knowledge of the
effectiveness of various treatment approaches can accordingly
be broadened by carefully constructed outcome studies.
Under the paternalistic power, however, addicts are less
susceptible of control, principally, but not exclusively, because
it is difficult to say that their best interests would in fact be
served by treatment when the fact is that conventional treat-
ment efforts have been notorious failures. At best, the parens
patriae power could compel the enrollment of addicts in some
sort of maintenance program. Interestingly, however, and con-
trary to the conventional wisdom, there seems to be some poten-
tial for the exercise of paternalistic power over non-addict nar-
cotics abusers, who can seemingly be effectively assisted at that
stage-by counseling, education, possible narcotic antagonists,
and even possibly by criminal penalties-so that they will never
become "untreatable" addicts.
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